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ABSTRACT
Large private companies are often characterized by poor corporate
governance that harms an array of stakeholders. WeWork provides a recent,
high-profile example of such harms. The WeWork vision, and the
dominating personality of its co-founder, Adam Neumann, attracted billions
of investment dollars. As a private company with a valuation in excess of
$1 billion, WeWork was a “unicorn.” In January 2019, WeWork was valued
at $47 billion, and SoftBank alone had invested more than $9 billion.
In August 2019, however, a draft of the company’s Form S-1
registration statement was made public. Analysts and the financial press
raised serious concerns. The filing revealed an aggressive multi-class voting
structure, and an equally bold assessment of profitability reached through
very creative accounting. WeWork scrambled to make changes, but the
weaknesses proved too much. The IPO was cancelled; valuations were
adjusted down to between $8 and $10 billion; SoftBank took control by
injecting another $9.5 billion, approximately $1.7 billion of which was to be
used to remove Neumann; and a new management team was installed,
putatively to turn the company into a model of responsible corporate
governance. Thousands of employees were laid off and collateral businesses
were sold or shuttered.
Perhaps this story vindicates U.S. financial market regulation: the
transparency required by federal securities law ultimately triumphed, and
WeWork corrected course. But why did corporate and securities laws enable
the WeWork “debacle” in the first place? Why were the substantial costs,
both direct and collateral, to the WeWork stakeholders, not least its investors,
not avoided?
Unicorns have absorbed hundreds of billions of investment dollars, but
unfortunately have also generated massive externalities. When they have
succeeded, unicorns have delivered enormous gains for their founders,
insiders, and early-stage investors. When they have failed, these entities
have imposed substantial hardships on investors and a wide array of
stakeholders including employees, customers, suppliers, lenders, the
economy, and society itself.
This article explores some of the reasons for the persistently poor
governance of unicorns, with emphasis on the homogeneity of company
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boards and of decision-makers at the entities funding them. It looks at both
securities and corporate law and analyzes how such laws work (or mostly do
not, but could, work) to protect investors and other stakeholders.
This article argues that poor governance could be remedied by existing
laws. It also proposes specific changes that might be made to rein in unicorns
and protect stakeholders.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. A Unicorn Runs Amok
Imagine that you have invested your money in a company. Or imagine
that you are a fund manager who has invested the money that other people
rely on for their retirement savings. What would you do if you learned that
the chief executive officer and chairman of the board of that company:
• used company funds to establish many unrelated collateral
businesses (including a “progressive” school for his children,
ages 2-8);1
• received hundreds of millions of dollars in loans from the
company;2
• cashed out hundreds of millions of dollars of his3 shares in the
company;4
• regularly “hotboxed” the company jet (filled it with marijuana
smoke) during business trips to Europe;5
1. Ellen Huet & Gillian Tan, WeWork Was a Family Affair, Until Things Got
Complicated, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 28, 2019, 8:00 AM EDT), https://www.blo
omberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-28/wework-was-a-family-affair-until-things-got-compli
cated [https://perma.cc/W7C7-LK8H].
2. Lisa Eadicicco, WeWork IPO Reveals Company Loaned Millions to CEO Adam
Neumann and Other Company Execs, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2019, 12:34 PM), https://www.
businessinsider.com/wework-ipo-company-loaned-7-million-ceo-adam-neumann-2019-8 [ht
tps://perma.cc/6YJH-X86D].
3. The male-gendered pronoun “his” is used in these examples because they refer to the
actions of a particular individual who, like almost all unicorn founders, venture capitalists and
fund managers, is male. See discussion below in Part II.A.3 (discussing the lack of diversity
in unicorn boards).
4. Rebecca Aydin, The History of WeWork - from Its First Office in a SoHo Building to
Pushing Out CEO and Cofounder Adam Neumann, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2019, 1:32 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/wework-ipo-we-company-history-founder-story-timelineadam-neumann-2019-8 [https://perma.cc/S2M9-TU7E].
5. Amy Chozick, Adam Neumann and the Art of Failing Up, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/business/adam-neumann-wework-exit-package.html
[https://perma.cc/K2PA-3Y5T]. In the employment discrimination suit filed against
Neumann and WeWork, former Chief of Staff Medina Bardhi alleged that, when pregnant,
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renamed the company, picking a name to which he had reserved
the rights, and charged the company $6 million to use its new
name;6
purchased real estate and then leased the real estate to the
company;7
hosted notoriously alcohol-fueled parties at many company
locations;8
claimed to aspire to being “president of the world”;9
described the company as a “state of consciousness”;10
embarked on a rapid growth campaign causing massive losses
but used a creative accounting method called “communityadjusted EBITDA” or “contribution margin” to recharacterize
them as gains;11

she had to stop traveling with Neumann on overseas flights due to Neumann’s “hotbox”
practice. See Class and Collective Administrative Charge of Discrimination, Retaliation, and
Gender Pay Disparity, Bardhi v. The We Co., No. [ ] (EEOC filed Oct. 31, 2019), available
at http://www.wigdorlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Bardhi-v.-WeWork-Filed.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/5AH4-VD36] (“ . . . [Ms. Bardhi] could no longer accompany Mr. Neumann
on business travel, particularly due to his penchant for bringing marijuana on chartered flights
and smoking it throughout the flight while in the enclosed cabin. Ms. Bardhi obviously could
not expose her unborn child to marijuana smoke, much less in such an enclosed space for
hours at a time.”).
6. See Chozick, supra note 5 (explaining how Neumann reserved the rights to “We,”
and renamed the company “We Companies,” charging it $5.9 million for the name). The
payment was returned after public outcry. Id.
7. Eliot Brown, WeWork’s CEO Makes Millions as Landlord to WeWork, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 16, 2019, 10:01 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/weworks-ceo-makes-millions-a
s-landlord-to-wework-11547640000 [https://perma.cc/HCN3-3PCV].
8. Chozick, supra note 5.
9. Chozick, supra note 5.
10. See David Gelles, The WeWork Manifesto: First, Office Space. Next, the World, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/business/the-wework-manifest
o-first-office-space-next-the-world.html
[https://perma.cc/T2E4-VZTD]
(explaining
Neumann’s ambition to transform the way people work, live, and play).
11. The WeWork August 2019 Form S-1 showed losses of $429 million on $436 million
in revenue in 2016, losses of $890 million on $886 million in revenue in 2017, and losses of
$1.6 billion on $1.8 billion in revenue in 2018. Troy Wolverton & Shona Ghosh, WeWork
Files for IPO, Revealing Spiraling Losses of $1.6 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2019, 7:28
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/wework-s-1-prospectus-ipo-revenue-cash-flow-2019
-8 [https://perma.cc/J8SP-M2JH]; see also Nori Gerardo Lietz, WeWork – The IPO That
Shouldn’t?, HARV. BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 18, 2019), https://hbswk.hbs.edu
/item/wework-the-ipo-that-shouldn-t [https://perma.cc/8LJ5-KTE3] (explaining defects in the
“contribution margin” metric); Jamie Powell, The magic of adjustments: ebitla-dee-da, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/884e7da3-2de7-3c56-bdff-a308152ce086
[https://perma.cc/E9GJ-NM24] (calling Community Adjusted Ebitda “a rather quixotic take
on the famous Ebitda metric”).
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owned a majority of the stock, including shares in a class that
received 20 votes-per-share, ensuring his lifetime control, and
control by his family generations into the future;12
• hired his spouse and close family members for key leadership
positions;13 and
• set up a system that, in the event of his death, permitted his
spouse to name his successor.14
Would you try to vote the individual off of the board of directors, or
remove him as CEO? Would you try to introduce some counterbalancing
influence into the company? Would you sell your stake? Or would you
remain invested, and even invest more?
In 2019, as the irregularities at WeWork (renamed “We Company” in
January 2019,15 but “WeWork” for purposes of this article) were revealed,
its investors grappled with such questions. The WeWork debacle captured
public attention. But the drama had a dark side: jobs were lost, investments
disappeared, careers sidetracked, and presumably, more responsible startups
found it more difficult to raise capital.16
12. Troy Wolverton, Adam Neumann Has Locked Up Control of The We Company in a
Jaw-Dropping Way, Even by Silicon Valley Standards, by Giving Himself 20 Votes Per Share,
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2019, 4:15 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/wework-ceoadam-neumann-stock-gives-20-votes-a-share-2019-8 [https://perma.cc/8LXD-NYW2]; see
also Connie Loizos, Adam Neumann planned for his children and grandchildren to control
WeWork, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 18, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/18/adam-neumannplanned-for-his-children-and-grandchildren-to-control-wework/ [https://perma.cc/QQ6Q-BC
93] (quoting Neumann as saying that WeWork isn’t “just controlled, we’re generationally
controlled” and describing how one of his great-great-granddaughters will still control the
company).
13. Huet & Tan, supra note 1; see also Eric Platt & Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson,
WeWork: How the Ultimate Unicorn Lost Its Billions, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://ww
w.ft.com/content/7938752a-52a7-11ea-90ad-25e377c0ee1f [https://perma.cc/RTK8-RE5P]
(explaining that Rebekah Paltrow Neuman was elevated to co-founder and described as
Neumann’s “strategic thought partner” in WeWork’s August 2019 draft Form S-1).
14. Huet & Tan, supra note 1; Platt & Edgecliffe-Johnson, supra note 13.
15. Paige Leskin, WeWork Is Changing Its Name to ‘The We Company’ as SoftBank
Invests $2 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2019, 9:58 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
wework-changes-name-to-the-we-company-2019-1 [https://perma.cc/9SU3-5NP9].
16. See Kate Rooney, WeWork’s pre-IPO troubles serve as a reality check for start-ups
as ‘growth at any cost’ dies, CNBC (Sept. 13, 2019) https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/13/we
works-pre-ipo-troubles-serve-as-reality-check-for-start-ups-as-growth-at-any-cost-dies.html
[https://perma.cc/68GS-6SL4] (calling WeWork a cautionary tale for investors); see also
Charles Duhigg, How Venture Capitalists Are Deforming Capitalism, NEW YORKER (Nov. 23,
2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/11/30/how-venture-capitalists-are-defor
ming-capitalism?irclickid=yEl06X3JExyLTfbwUx0Mo372UkEWC0ydw1X91E0&irgwc=1
&source=affiliate_impactpmx_12f6tote_desktop_Bing%20Rebates%20by%20Microsoft&ut
m_source=impact-affiliate&utm_medium=2003851&utm_campaign=impact&utm_content
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Established in 2010 by Adam Neumann and Miguel McKelvey,17
WeWork acquires office space, redecorates it with modern furniture and
features like fizzy water taps and pinball machines,18 and then leases access
to the space on a short-term basis.19 Buying commercial real estate and then
leasing it out is hardly a new idea, but Neumann aspired to reinvent work20
and to “elevate the world’s consciousness.”21 Although fundamentally a real
estate development company, in “vision,” WeWork resembled the most
brash of technology start-ups. It called itself an “SaaS” (space-as-a-service)
provider.22 Neuman pronounced, sententiously, that WeWork is “the world’s
first physical social network.”23 The company, it was said, would encompass
all aspects of human life.24
=Logo&utm_brand=tny [https://perma.cc/6FSF-GH4A] (discussing the fundraising
difficulties encountered by NextSpace Coworking, a co-working start-up that was earning a
modest profit when WeWork began to attract attention from investors).
17. Reeves Wiedeman, The I in We: How Did WeWork’s Adam Neumann Turn Office
Space with “Community” into a $47 Billion Company? Not by Sharing, N.Y. MAG. (June 10,
2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/06/wework-adam-neumann.html [https://perma.
cc/X86C-9HK7].
18. See Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Pinball, Fizzy Water and Helium Balloons: Why
Small Office Perks Loom Large, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/4a
5b74cc-c928-11e9-af46-b09e8bfe60c0 [https://perma.cc/GV7N-VRWL] (noting WeWork’s
shuffleboard tables and “kombucha-stuffed fridges”); see also Katherine Rosman, We Work.
We Live. We Work Out. Eventually We Die., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytim
es.com/2017/10/12/style/wework-fitness-gyms.html [https://perma.cc/PE37-F3CJ] (calling
the WeWork decorating style “foosball-infused bro-deco”).
19. See George Schultze, Why WeWork Won’t Work: Hello Neumann! FORBES (Oct. 8,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeschultze/2019/10/08/why-wework-wont-work-h
ello-neumann/?sh=3552ae624e03 [https://perma.cc/8Q3F-KQNB] (explaining the WeWork
business model as “not much more than an office rental company that acts as a middleman
between landlords and short-term tenants”).
20. See We Co., Draft Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) at 5 (Aug. 14, 2019),
available at https://sec.report/Document/0001628279-19-000233/ [https://perma.cc/29S8-M
5FZ] (“We believe that we have laid the foundation to capitalize on our significant market
opportunity by continuing to reinvent the future of work.”); see also Ian Bogost, The Wildly
Appealing, Totally Doomed Future of Work, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.the
atlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/09/why-wework-was-destined-fail/598891/ [https://pe
rma.cc/52N4-P6R8] (noting that the company was supposed to reinvent work itself).
21. See We Co., supra note 20, at 1 (“Our mission is to elevate the world’s
consciousness.”).
22. See Kara Swisher, WeWork: Is There Any There There?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/opinion/wework-ipo.html [https://perma.cc/25WE-W
WVD] (describing WeWork’s characterization of its workstation rentals as “space-as-aservice,” a play on the influential “software-as-a-service sector”).
23. Wiedeman, supra note 17.
24. See Katrina Brooker, Exclusive: WeWork rebrands to The We Company; CEO
Neumann talks about revised Softbank round, FASTCOMPANY (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.fas
tcompany.com/90289512/exclusive-wework-to-rebrand-to-the-we-company-in-wake-of-
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The WeWork vision, and Neumann’s dominating personality, attracted
billions of investment dollars. By August of 2019, SoftBank25 alone had
invested more than $9 billion.26 As a private company with a valuation in
excess of $1 billion, WeWork was a “unicorn.”27 In its January 2019 funding
round, WeWork was valued at $47 billion.28 Investment bankers pitching
their initial public offering (“IPO”) services to the company in 2018 and
2019 valued WeWork at between $46 and $104 billion.29
For years, analysts and the financial press raised questions about the
company. Reports were published about Neumann and the incredible losses
incurred by his company.30 But the sheer magnitude of investments made in
WeWork, the prestige of the company’s attorneys and investment bankers,
disappointing-funding-news [https://perma.cc/S688-8J3E] (reporting that Neumann planned
for the company to encompass all aspects of people’s lives, in both physical and digital
worlds).
25. SoftBank Group Corp. and its $100 billion Vision Fund, which is backed by the
company and two Middle Eastern sovereign-wealth funds, will be referred to together as
“SoftBank” in this article.
26. Phred Dvorak & Justin Baer, SoftBank’s WeWork Bailout Draws Investor Concern,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2019, 6:34 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbanks-weworkbailout-draws-investor-concern-11572086091 [https://perma.cc/U29M-R28T]; see also
Maureen Farrell & Eliot Brown, The Money Men Who Enabled Adam Neumann and the
WeWork Debacle, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2019, 12:00 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/the-money-men-who-enabled-adam-neumann-and-the-wework-debacle-11576299616 [http
s://perma.cc/RN7Z-FW5U] (discussing SoftBank’s investment); Megan Hernbroth, Meet Ron
Fisher, the SoftBank Executive on WeWork’s Board Leading the Campaign to Oust CEO
Adam Neumann, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:36 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com
/meet-ron-fisher-softbank-vision-fund-behind-wework-valuation-ipo-2019-9 [https://perma.
cc/3EGG-VBSY] (same).
27. See Aileen Lee, Welcome to The Unicorn Club: Learning From Billion-Dollar
Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013, 2:00 PM EDT), https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/w
elcome-to-the-unicorn-club/ [https://perma.cc/TR4P-FWMB] (coining the term “unicorn”).
28. Sara Salinas & Deirdre Bosa, WeWork Is Rebranding, and SoftBank Ups Its
Investment by $2 Billion, CNBC (Jan. 8, 2019, 9:13 AM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/
01/08/wework-rebranding-as-the-we-company-softbank-invests-2-billion.html [https://perm
a.cc/R3NE-DKY5].
29. See Eric Platt et al., WeWork Turmoil Puts Spotlight on JPMorgan Chase and
Goldman Sachs, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/272d408e-de40-11
e9-b112-9624ec9edc59 [https://perma.cc/BV73-J2X3] (identifying the banks as JP Morgan
Chase, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley).
30. See, e.g., Rebecca Aydin, WeWork isn’t even close to being profitable – it loses
$219,000 every hour of every day, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 3, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.
com/wework-not-close-to-profitable-loses-hundreds-thousands-every-hour-2019-7
[https://perma.cc/9BPS-RC6S] (describing the company as “hemorrhaging money”); Michael
J. de la Merced, WeWork’s Losses Swell to Nearly $2 Billion as It Seeks Global Expansion,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/business/dealbook/wewo
rk-loss-billion.html [https://perma.cc/C583-DPYU] (noting that the company’s losses had
doubled from the prior year).
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and Neumann’s charismatic personality muted many concerns.31
WeWork was expected to be the second largest unicorn to go public in
2019.32 When a draft of the company’s Form S-1 registration statement was
made public in August of 2019,33 however, the skeptics began to outshout
the boosters. Criticized as a “masterpiece of obfuscation,”34 the filing
revealed the heavily weighted multi-class voting structure, and the
confusing, creative accounting the company used to assess profitability.35 In

31. See Eliot Brown, How Adam Neuman’s Over-the-Top Style Built WeWork. ‘This Is
Not the Way Everybody Behaves’, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/article
s/this-is-not-the-way-everybody-behaves-how-adam-neumanns-over-the-top-style-built-we
work-11568823827 [https://perma.cc/6X2H-NKBR] (describing Neumann’s “combination
of entrepreneurial vision, personal charisma and brash risk-taking”).
32. See Drew Singer, WeWork Analyst Warns IPO Filing a ‘Masterpiece of Obfuscation’,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 20, 2019, 8:00 AM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201
9-08-20/wework-analyst-warns-ipo-filing-a-masterpiece-of-obfuscation [https://perma.cc/D
CH7-9A6J] (pointing out that the offering was expected to raise $3.5 billion).
33. We Co., supra note 20. Five versions of the Form S-1 had been submitted to the SEC
confidentially before the August 14, 2019 version was filed. We Co., Draft Registration
Statement Filings (Form DRS & S-1/A) (Dec. 28, 2018; Apr. 25, 2019; May 14, 2019; June
19, 2019; July 18, 2019). Filings can be found through EDGAR System search on sec.gov,
available at https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001533
523&owner=exclude&count=40&hidefilings=0 [https://perma.cc/M6ZQ-W4PW].
34. Triton Research Inc. CEO Rett Wallace called the prospectus a “masterpiece of
obfuscation.” Singer, supra note 32.
35. We Co., supra note 20. Analysts pointed out that using a “contribution margin”
metric, WeWork was not recording marketing and sales expenses at its locations once they
were open for two years, despite the fact that the expenses were still being paid. See, e.g.,
Daniel Strauss, WeWork’s IPO Documents Baffled an Analyst Who Specializes in Evaluating
Companies Preparing to Go Public, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2019, 2:24 PM), https://markets
.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/weworks-ipo-filing-makes-it-impossible-to-model-analyst
-says-2019-8-1028460674 [https://perma.cc/9AWB-YBMY] (“ . . . the company stops
recording marketing and sales expenses at WeWork locations once they’ve been open for two
years even though the expenses don’t actually stop.”). WeWork’s draft Form S-1 revealed a
loss of $1.6 billion on $1.8 billion of revenue in 2018. Ellen Florian, Here’s Why WeWork
Won’t Be in the S&P 500 after Its IPO, FORTUNE (Aug. 20, 2019, 2:30 PM EDT), https://fort
une.com/2019/08/20/wework-ipo-s-and-p-500/ [https://perma.cc/6JS3-MLHF]. The unusual
metric, given the costs it excluded, raised questions among analysts and regulators. See
Amanda Iacone, SEC Flags Cash-Flow Measure That Made WeWork Look Profitable (1),
BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 3, 2019, 4:45 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/financial-accountin
g/sec-flags-cash-flow-measure-that-made-wework-look-profitable [https://perma.cc/J2KT-A
EJB] (noting that the SEC was reviewing the financial reporting and disclosures); Scott
Galloway, NYU Professor Calls WeWork ‘WeWTF’ Says Any Wall Street Analyst Who
Believes It’s Worth Over $10 Billion is ‘Lying, Stupid, or Both,’ BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2019,
9:48 AM) (calling WeWork’s “community-based Ebitda” an invented metric that does not
account for expenses comprising the bulk of costs required to deliver service).
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response, the company revised36 the “sloppy”37 Form S-1. WeWork also
announced measures to address some of the governance concerns, including
the company’s ultimately unsuccessful plans to place its first woman,
Harvard Business School Professor Frances Frei, on its board of directors.38
Despite such belated efforts, the weaknesses of the company’s
governance proved too much. In the next three months, the IPO was
cancelled; some valuations were adjusted down to as low as $8 billion;39
SoftBank took control40 by injecting another $9.5 billion, approximately $1.7
36. WeWork amended the Form S-1 twice more in fall 2019, filing amended versions
September 4, 2019 and September 13, 2019. We Co., Draft Registration Statement Filings
(Form S-1/A) (Sept. 04, 2019; Sept. 13, 2019). Filings can be found through EDGAR System
search on sec.gov, available at https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompa
ny&CIK=0001533523&owner=exclude&count=40&hidefilings=0 [https://perma.cc/PC8TW4UH].
37. See Jean Eaglesham & Eliot Brown, WeWork Investors Turned Off by “Sloppy” IPO
Filings, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2019, 5:31 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-inv
estors-turned-off-by-sloppy-ipo-filings-11570440674
[https://perma.cc/56AH-BD57]
(quoting Nori Gerardo Lietz, a Harvard Business School lecturer who analyzed WeWork).
38. Patrick Clark & Jeff Green, WeWork Adds Harvard’s Frei to All-Mall Board After
Criticism, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 4, 2019, 11:13:15), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/docume
nt/PXBBM36JIJUO [https://perma.cc/23P4-NC4F] (announcing WeWork’s plan to add
Frances Frei to its all-male board of directors before becoming a public company). Professor
Frei did not end up joining the board. Gillian Tan & Ellen Huet, WeWork Chairman Says
Diversity is Coming to All-Male Board, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 31, 2019, 15:49:34), https://ww
w.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-31/wework-executive-chairman-claure-promisesmore-board-diversity [https://perma.cc/3AT4-W39C] (reporting that Frances Frei was not
expected to join WeWork following the withdrawal of the IPO). WeWork’s first female board
member, SoftBank executive and Facebook veteran Kirthiga Reddy, joined the board in early
2020, after WeWork management was reorganized. See David Jeans, Exclusive: 3 WeWork
Board Members Depart, Another to Follow, THEREALDEAL (Feb. 6, 2020, 10:11 AM), https
://therealdeal.com/2020/02/06/exclusive-three-wework-board-members-depart-another-to-fo
llow/ [https://perma.cc/MJA8-GN54] (describing the board shakeup as a “changing of the
guard” at WeWork).
39. Sergei Klebnikov, WeWork’s Valuation Plummets to $8 Billion as Softbank
Completes Takeover, FORBES (Oct. 21, 2019, 4:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergei
klebnikov/2019/10/21/weworks-valuation-plummets-to-8-billion-as-softbank-completes-tak
e-over/#4121a094a482 [https://perma.cc/2KSU-DUNL].
40. Mary Meisenzahl, WeWork’s had a terrible 2 months, and now SoftBank is reportedly
taking control of the company in a bailout deal, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2019, 9:04 AM), http
s://www.businessinsider.com/wework-ipo-timeline-delayed-ceo-adam-neumann-scandalsexplained-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/KDB3-BT93]. SoftBank’s WeWork bailout reportedly
left it with 80% of the company, but SoftBank claimed it would not hold a majority of the
voting rights – WeWork’s board would get voting control of Neumann’s shares – and so it
did not “control” WeWork. See Tom Zanki, SoftBank Takes 80% WeWork Stake As Ex-CEO
Cedes Power, LAW360 (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1212170/softbanktakes-80-wework-stake-as-ex-ceo-cedes-power [https://perma.cc/LW4F-FFEK] (describing
WeWork as an “associate,” not a “subsidiary,” of SoftBank). Nevertheless, Softbank
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billion of which was to be used to separate Neumann;41 and a new
management team set about turning the company into a model of responsible
corporate governance,42 with an eye toward making a profit.43 Thousands of

reportedly sought approval of the package from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS), which reviews foreign investments in the United States for national
security risks. See Sarah McBride & David McLaughlin, SoftBank to Seek U.S. National
Security Review of WeWork Deal, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.bloomber
g.com/news/articles/2019-10-23/softbank-to-seek-u-s-national-security-review-of-weworkdeal [https://perma.cc/3RB3-U9L4] (noting that SoftBank has had trouble with CFIUS in the
past).
41. Gerrit de Vynck et al., WeWork hires corporate turnaround artist with ‘plenty of luck’ as
new CEO, FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2020, 8:02 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/02/03/wework-hires-sand
eep-mathrani-new-ceo/ [https://perma.cc/9CDF-8KYV]; see also Maureen Farrell & Eliot
Brown, SoftBank to Boost Stake in WeWork in Deal That Cuts Most Ties with Neumann,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2019, 11:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-to-take-contr
ol-of-wework-11571746483 [https://perma.cc/6QKK-CFSY] (reporting that the deal
involved a $185 million consulting fee to Neumann, Neumann’s right to sell SoftBank
approximately one-third of his WeWork shares for $970 million, and a SoftBank credit to
Neumann of $500 million to enable him to pay off loans made to him by several banks); Eliot
Brown, WeWork Employee Options Underwater as Ex-CEO Reaps, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23,
2019, 6:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-employees-feel-sting-as-ex-ceo-stan
ds-to-reap-11571870011 [https://perma.cc/YK7Y-DR79] (reporting the Neumann would
receive up to $1.7 billion as part of the deal with SoftBank). The agreement with Neumann
was described as “extraordinary.” Joseph E. Bachelder III, Compensation and Separation
Agreement for WeWork CEO, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 27, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.law.com/ne
wyorklawjournal/2019/12/27/compensation-and-separation-arrangements-for-weworkceo/?slreturn=20200116183437 [https://perma.cc/2CTP-XQU9]. But see Rolfe Winkler,
WeWork Chairman Says Consulting Deal with Adam Neumann No Longer in Place, WALL,
ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/softbank-backs-out-of-consulting-deal-w
ith-wework-co-founder-adam-neumann-11603136659
[https://perma.cc/9TNE-CLLY]
(quoting WeWork Executive Chairman Marcelo Claure as saying, “I don’t think that
consulting agreement is still in place”).
42. See Matt Levine, WeSurrender, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.
bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-27/we-moves-fast-to-unbreak-things [https://perm
a.cc/FT6T-U4NB] (describing WeWork’s efforts to change everything the markets did not
like and proceed with the IPO as a “bizarre triumph of corporate governance”).
43. WeWork appointed Sandeep Mathrani, a real estate industry veteran, as CEO on
February 1, 2020. Under Mathrani, WeWork announced plans to refocus on office rentals
and walk away from passion projects. See Andrea Navarro & Gillian Tan, WeWork Adds
Maurice Levy, SoftBank Executives in Turnaround Plan, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 22, 2019), https://ww
w.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-22/wework-appoints-new-executives-as-part-of-fi
ve-year-plan [https://perma.cc/3KF7-23R9] (outlining WeWork’s five-year turnaround plan);
Gerrit de Vynck et al., WeWork hires corporate turnaround artist with ‘plenty of luck’ as new CEO,
FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2020, 8:02 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/02/03/wework-hires-sandeep-mathr
ani-new-ceo [https://perma.cc/N4LU-MUWC] (discussing Mathrani’s “turnaround
expertise.”).
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employees were laid off,44 and collateral businesses were sold or shuttered.45
Some have argued that this story vindicates U.S. financial market
regulation: the transparency required by federal securities law ultimately
triumphed, and WeWork corrected course.46 But why did corporate and
securities laws enable the WeWork “debacle”47 in the first place? Why were
the substantial costs, both direct and collateral, to the WeWork stakeholders,
not least its investors, not avoided?
B. The Unicorn Governance Problem
WeWork is certainly a dramatic case,48 and it would be nice to think of
it as anomalous. But WeWork is not alone in the “weirdo sparkly unicorn
governance” category.49 Uber, led by its explosive50 founder Travis
Kalanick, was beset with claims of discrimination and sexual harassment of
employees;51 was alleged to have been complicit in the theft of intellectual

44. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Inside WeWork’s week from hell: How the mass layoffs went
down, CNN BUS. (Nov. 22, 2019, 4:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/22/tech/weworklayoffs-staffers-react/index.html [https://perma.cc/3TRP-3PL9]; Annie Palmer, WeWork lays
off 2,400 employees, CNBC: TECH (Nov. 21, 2019, 10:48 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/
11/21/wework-lays-off-2400-employees.html [https://perma.cc/49RB-A2NK].
45. See discussion infra Part III.C.3 (discussing how WeWork’s poor corporate
governance led to the sudden shuttering of WeWork’s unrelated collateral ventures).
46. See Anne Sraders, The fall of WeWork was a jolt to venture capital–how that could
change VC investing, FORTUNE (Jan. 22, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2020/01/22/v
c-news-venture-capital-outlook-2020/ [https://perma.cc/K6EQ-JY3N] (asserting that “[i]f the
WeWork debacle and the poor public debuts of companies like Uber, Lyft, and
SmileDirectClub taught us anything it’s that the public markets are going to be tougher on
high-flying unicorns.”).
47. Farrell & Brown, supra note 26.
48. See Maureen Farrell et al., SoftBank Seeking to Take Control of WeWork Through
Financing Package, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2019, 7:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sof
tbank-seeking-to-take-control-of-wework-through-financing-package-11571002488 [https://
perma.cc/U8G8-WDNC] (describing WeWork as the “poster child” for startup excesses).
49. Matt Levine, WeWhoosh, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.bloomb
erg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-09/we-might-not-be-working [https://perma.cc/K3QV-26
LY] (describing WeWork as the “absolute limit case of unicorn craziness”).
50. See Mike Isaac, Inside Uber’s Aggressive, Unrestrained Workplace Culture, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/technology/uber-workplace-cu
lture.html [https://perma.cc/387F-64B5] (describing Uber’s CEO, Travis Kalanick, as
creating a “pugnacious” and “aggressive” work culture).
51. Uber settled an EEOC sexual harassment probe in December 2019, for $4.4 million.
See Press Release, EEOC, Uber to Pay $4.4 Million to Resolve EEOC Sexual Harassment
and Retaliation Charges (Dec. 18, 2019), available at https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/
release/12-18-19.cfm [https://perma.cc/SGB3-2N3C] (stating that Uber had agreed to
strengthen its business culture against sexual harassment and retaliation).
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property;52 and used software to elude detection by local regulators, from
whom it lacked operational permission.53 Theranos, under the control of
Elizabeth Holmes, sold clients a blood testing technology that did not really
exist.54 Zenefits, which sold software that enabled companies to manage
their human resources, allowed unlicensed employees to sell insurance.55
Other examples abound.56
Unicorns have absorbed hundreds of billions of investment dollars, but
unfortunately have also generated massive externalities.57 When they have
52. Isaac, supra note 50; see also Paayal Zaveri & Jillian d’Onfro, Travis Kalanick takes
the stand to explain why Uber wanted to poach Google self-driving engineer, CNBC (Feb. 6,
2018) https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/travis-kalanick-reveals-why-he-wanted-googles-an
thony-levandowski.html [https://perma.cc/5RKP-6JH5] (describing Kalanick’s involvement
in the trade secrets trial between Uber and Waymo).
53. See Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evade-auth
orities.html [https://perma.cc/8FP5-XVR5] (describing Uber’s Greyball program, which used
data collected form the Uber app and other techniques to evade authorities).
54. Nick Bilton, Exclusive: How Elizabeth Holmes’s House of Cards Came Tumbling
Down, VANITY FAIR HIVE (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/elizabe
th-holmes-theranos-exclusive [https://perma.cc/X35G-V697]; see also Charles Duhigg, supra
note 16 (calling Theranos a “dubious” start-up and noting that it raised seven hundred million
dollars from investors before it was revealed as a fraud).
55. Kia Kokalitcheva, Major CEO Shakeup At Zenefits Over Regulatory Problems,
FORTUNE (Feb. 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/02/08/zenefits-parker-conrad-resigns/ [http
s://perma.cc/7KXZ-XB3U]. After Zenefits co-founder Parker Conrad was forced out as CEO
in 2016, he co-founded employee-management software company Rippling, which was
valued at $270 million in 2019. Josh Constine, Rippling raises $45 million at $270 million to
be the biz app identity layer, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 3, 2019, 9:18 AM), https://techcrunch.com
/2019/04/03/rippling-45-million/ [https://perma.cc/8G2P-K32A].
56. In 2019, food delivery service Postmates postponed its IPO. Among other things, the
company had endured a messy fight with its employees after restructuring pay rates. Carolyn
Said, ‘No rich people working for Postmates’: Couriers protest pay change, S.F. CHRON.
(May 21, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/There-are-no-rich-people-wor
king-for-13867172.php [https://perma.cc/8APY-XAG7]. Online trading app Robinhood also
postponed its IPO in 2019 after a number of controversies, including bad publicity and an
SEC fine over revelations that it was selling customer orders to high-frequency traders. Dave
Michaels, Robinhood Settles Claims It Didn’t Ensure Best Prices for Customer Trades, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2019, 12:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/robinhood-settles-claims-it-d
idnt-ensure-best-prices-for-customer-trades-11576776167 [https://perma.cc/VVB6-PP3S].
The stock trading app, however, went on to raise over $500 million the following year. See
Jeff John Roberts, Robinhood raises $200M as IPO speculation swirls, FORTUNE (Aug. 17,
2020, 11:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/08/17/robinhood-ipo-speculation-funding-roundseries-g-predictions/ [https://perma.cc/4ZB8-55FH] (noting that the company claimed a
valuation of $11.2 billion).
57. See Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165,
167 (2017) (discussing several unicorn stumbles); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert
B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101
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succeeded, unicorns have delivered enormous gains for their founders,
insiders, and early-stage investors.58 When they have failed, these entities
have imposed substantial hardships on investors and a wide array of
stakeholders, including employees,59 customers, suppliers, lenders, the
economy,60 and society itself.61
When privately held highly valued companies were first given the
moniker “unicorns” in 2013, the name was intended to convey the rarity of

GEO. L.J. 337, 340 (2013) (exploring the public-private divide after the JOBS Act was
enacted). For example, when financing negotiations between the robotic pizza company
Zume and Softbank broke down in 2019, hundreds of employees were laid off. Sraders, supra
note 46.
58. See Kate Vinton, Meet The 14 Unicorn Startups That Have Created 25 Billionaires,
FORBES (Mar. 6, 2016, 7:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2016/03/06/meetthe-14-unicorn-startups-that-have-created-25-billionaires/#18408fb5485b [https://perma.cc/
A5K7-UEBM] (finding among other things that Uber and Airbnb produced three billionaires
each, while Snapchat and Pinterest produced two each).
59. For example, when London-based augmented reality unicorn Blippar went under in
2018, all employees were let go. Paul Sawers, The rise and fall of augmented reality ‘unicorn’
Blippar, VENTUREBEAT, (Dec. 18, 2018, 11:23 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2018/12/18/therise-and-fall-of-augmented-reality-unicorn-blippar/ [https://perma.cc/KZ57-524W].
60. See, e.g., Jason Zweig, How We Should Bust an Investing Myth, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
24, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-we-should-bust-an-investing-myth11568991786 [https://perma.cc/7ZN8-DJU4] (noting that the private markets are more prone
to error than the public markets because they are both shallow and narrow and prone to overoptimistic valuations); see also Farrell & Brown, supra note 26 (claiming that WeWork
investors’ “extraordinarily optimistic” perspectives “supercharged WeWork’s visions of
grandeur”).
61. See, e.g., Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications for
Regulating Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. 197 (2017) (providing a critical perspective on
unicorns that deploy rhetoric and persuasion to subvert regulation and harm consumers and
communities). Consider Arrivo Corporation, a California-based unicorn founded by engineer
Brogan BamBrogan, after he was “dramatically ousted” from Hyperloop One in 2016.
Andrew J. Hawkins, Ousted Hyperloop One founder Brogan BamBrogan just atarted a new
company, THE VERGE (Feb. 9, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/2/9/145599
74/hyperloop-brogan-bambrogan-arrivo-los-angeles-lawsuit
[perma.cc/75WQ-ATC9].
Arrivo successfully pitched a magnetic levitation rail system to the Colorado Department of
Transporation (CDOT) and then shut down, inflicting costs on its investors as well as the state
of Colorado. Aaron Gordon, How Arrivo Got Colorado to Back a Wild-Eyed Highway
Scheme, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/arrivo-coloradobrogan-bambrogan-hyperloop-concept [https://perma.cc/2LTN-3LF2]; Marshall Zelinger,
The Colorado Department of Transportation is rethinking the money it spends on technology,
9NEWS (Nov. 19, 2019, 7:42 PM), https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/next/the-color
ado-department-of-transportation-is-rethinking-the-money-it-spends-on-technology/734f986ed2-c676-4060-a083-105cb10ee860 [https://perma.cc/Q2RB-KRCY].
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such companies.62 They are not that rare anymore.63 Thanks to plentiful
venture capital and private equity funding, sustained low interest rates, the
(at least perceived) burden of becoming a reporting company under the U.S.
federal securities laws, and changes in those laws that enable some
companies to stay private longer,64 the number of unicorns has been steadily
rising. As of November 2020, there were approximately 500 unicorns, with
a cumulative valuation of over $1.58 trillion.65
Despite being the size of many public companies, many unicorns lack
the basic corporate governance one would expect, given the number of
zeroes on their (non-GAAP66) financial statements.67 Unicorns are often
characterized by few restraints on founder discretion and lack many of the
standard checks on corporate decision-making. Their upper echelons are
largely homogenous in terms of gender, i.e., are overwhelmingly male.68
Unicorns also appear to be vulnerable to strategic error, because their
62. See Lee, supra note 27 (comparing the rarity of developing a unicorn company to
catching an MLB foul ball or being struck by lightning). Of course, family-held companies
have been around forever, and may be valued at over $1 billion. Unicorns, however, achieve
these valuations in the feverish venture capital markets, not by dint of being a long-standing
dynasty. As discussed below, the valuations of unicorns may in some cases be inflated, or at
least optimistic. See Robert P. Bartlett III, A Founder’s Guide to Unicorn Creation: How
Liquidation Preferences in M&A Transactions Affect Start-up Valuation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1, 1–3 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
eds., 2016) (arguing that unicorn valuations are unreliable measures of firm value).
63. See Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy,
57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 587 (2016) (calling unicorns “ubiquitous”).
64. See Carlos Berdejo, Going Public after the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 14–17
(2015) (walking through some of the costs of being public); see also infra Part II.B.2
(discussing companies’ decisions to stay private longer).
65. The Complete List of Unicorn Companies, CB INSIGHTS, https://www.cbinsights.co
m/research-unicorn-companies [https://perma.cc/5EP7-HSL3] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
Other sources put the number even higher. See, e.g., Gené Teare, Private Unicorn Board Now
Above 600 Companies Valued At $2T, CRUNCHBASE NEWS, (June 29, 2020), https://news.cru
nchbase.com/news/private-unicorn-board-now-above-600-companies-valued-at-2t/ [https://p
erma.cc/9SV2-5ZD2] (putting the number of unicorns at 601 with a total valuation just under
$2 trillion).
66. GAAP refers to “generally accepted accounting principles” in the United States. 17
CFR § 244.101(b). The SEC requires reporting companies that are disclosing information
either to use GAAP or to provide information that reconciles their calculations with GAAP.
17 C.F.R. §244.100(a).
67. See Nori Gerardo Lietz, WeWork–The IPO That Shouldn’t?, HARVARD BUS. SCH.
WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 18, 2019), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/wework-the-ipo-thatshouldn-t [https://perma.cc/T6P9-YGB5] (discussing the misleading financial disclosure in
the WeWork August 2019 draft Form S-1).
68. See Jennifer S. Fan, Innovating Inclusion: The Impact of Women on Private Company
Boards, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345, 350 (2019) (noting that men control over 90% of unicorn
board seats).
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funding sources often provide only positive feedback.69 Many such
companies have been, and still are, led by founders who maintain control
over the company, sometimes even after the company goes public.70 As
WeWork exemplifies, many of these companies are run with a messianic
style71 and a lack of restraint reminiscent of the robber barons.72
One reason there are so many enormous private companies is that
successful start-ups are staying private longer. The average time between
first venture-capital financing and going public has increased from
approximately four years in the 1990s to seven years today.73 In 1980, the
average age of a company when it went public was six years; in 2019, it was
ten.74 Startups are not only able to stay independent and privately held long
after they first raise capital, late-stage startups have seen an increase in the
amount of capital they are able to raise, and therefore levels of employment
they are able to maintain.75 Without the near-term prospect of an IPO,
unicorns may lack incentives to impose the systems of corporate governance
that we expect from large corporations.76
69. See Jesse M. Fried & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Valuation and Governance Bubbles of
Silicon Valley, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 10, 2019, 11:29 PM), https://clsbluesky.law.
columbia.edu/2019/10/10/the-valuation-and-governance-bubbles-of-silicon-valley/ [https://p
erma.cc/JN56-8MH2] (noting that there is no way for investors to “short” an overvalued
startup).
70. See Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Snapchat’s Gift: Equity Culture
in High-Tech Firms, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 865 (2019) (highlighting founder control);
see also Dileep Rao, Is the Cult Of The “Unicorn-Founder” Dead?, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2020,
11:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dileeprao/2020/01/21/is-the-cult-of-the-unicorn-fo
under-dead/?sh=40db65405c70 [https://perma.cc/94RR-6HMP] (arguing that venture capital
investors frequently cede, and will continue to cede, control to unicorn founders).
71. Neumann is quoted as saying, “We are here in order to change the world . . . Nothing
less than that interests me.” Platt & Edgecliffe-Johnson, supra note 13.
72. See Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and the
Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 688, 693–95 (2018) (discussing
robber barons in the context of contemporary equity markets).
73. Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, The Deregulation of the Private Equity Markets
and the Decline in IPOs, REV. FIN. STUD., 3 (forthcoming Feb. 7, 2020), available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3017610 [https://perma.cc/J5XX-4U06V].
74. See Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics, UNIV. FLA.
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPO-Statistics.pdf?te=1&nl=debatable&emc=edit_
db_20210202 [https://perma.cc/8W96-U8A4] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020) (providing data
about the median age and fraction of IPOs with VC and buyout backing between 1980 and
2019).
75. See Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, The Deregulation of the Private Equity
Markets and the Decline in IPOs, 3 (May 9, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The
Review of Financial Studies), available at https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa053 [https://perma.
cc/G596-9URE] (noting that previously, these levels were only consistently achieved by
public companies).
76. See Paresh Dave & James Rufus Koren, Have Investors Allowed Tech Founders Like
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During their years in the “enchanted forest,” there is little internal need
for unicorn companies to establish governance mechanisms.77 Unicorns are
often led by a single or small number of male founders operating informally,
i.e., with few checks.78 Unicorns may often suffer from a lack of internal
discipline.79 While the idealized appeal is obvious – a small group of brilliant
friends founding a company – the lack of responsible governance in such
super-sized startups can harm a broad spectrum of stakeholders.
C. Poorly Governed Unicorns Threaten a Variety of Stakeholders
Although bad governance may be ignored by the legal regime and the
financial markets when companies are small, problems are not so easily
dismissed when billions of dollars and large numbers of people are involved.
One may be concerned with investors who provide their money (or, in
startups, often labor) to the firm in exchange for equity interests or debt.
State corporation laws and federal securities laws may apply in different
ways to protect those shareholders and other investors. Various laws may
also apply to additional persons interested in the firm, such as employees,
members of the community, suppliers, and consumers (collectively referred
to as “stakeholders”).
This article argues that many of the hundreds of unicorns impacting the
financial markets have unsatisfactory corporate governance, and it proposes
Uber’s Travis Kalanick to Grow too Powerful?, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2017, 3:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-investors-20170613-story.html
[https://perma.cc/TPM9-LBVV] (discussing Uber). But see Crystal Tse, Tech Unicorns
Rushing to Go Public Defy Sleepy Summer Season (1), BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 25, 2020,
8:53 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-25/tech-unicorns-rushing-togo-public-defy-sleepy-summer-season [https://perma.cc/HK2H-P7S8] (reporting that the lull
in the first months of the Covid-19 outbreak had ended, and 2020 turned out to be the ‘busiest
summer’ investment bankers could remember).
77. This is a common refrain. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Mutual Funds in the Enchanted
Forest, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/do
cument/PZ7WT66JTSEE?criteria_id=16fe85f88a3594201bf564f9306875a5 [https://perma.c
c/MZ2Z-WZN4] (noting that people are worried about unicorns).
78. According to a 2018 deal between Neumann and SoftBank, Softbank could remove
Neumann as CEO “only if he committed a violent crime and was jailed in a common law
jurisdiction.” See Platt & Edgecliffe-Johnson, supra note 13 (identifying this as an “extreme”
example of trust placed in founders).
79. See David Benoit et al., WeWork is a Mess for JP Morgan. Jamie Dimon is Cleaning
it up, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2019, 2:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-is-amess-for-jpmorgan-jamie-dimon-is-cleaning-it-up-11569349994 [https://perma.cc/8DNZ-54
XL] (“The governance reflects there are no adults in the room. The underwriters are as guilty
as the board for instituting a preposterous governance.”); see also Jones, supra note 57, at 167
(citing the “unique governance challenges” posed by unicorns).
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ways to address the problem. Part II walks through the ways corporation and
securities laws are failing to protect unicorn investors. Part III argues that
poor unicorn governance has even broader impacts and looks at the ways
other stakeholders are being harmed. Part IV considers and rejects the
argument that bad governance is a fair price to pay for the innovation offered
by some unicorns. Part V then turns to practical suggestions and walks
through a number of ways to rein in unicorns and protect stakeholders. Part
VI concludes, however, with the observation that real reform in unicorn
governance is not imminent.
II.

INVESTORS ARE HARMED

As this section shows, the law of corporate investment hardly ensures
that unicorns are well governed. As a result, people who have material
interests in the success of a unicorn are vulnerable. Specifically, this section
considers unicorn investors, first as shareholders who are not effectively
protected by state corporation law, and second, as investors who are not
effectively protected by federal securities law. The next section considers
stakeholders more broadly, who are also, generally, not legally protected
from the consequences of bad firm governance.
Big investments – especially big losing investments – get attention. As
of May 2020, SoftBank had invested $19.9 billion in WeWork, which
nonetheless was valued at only $8 billion.80 But not only venture capitalists
and institutional investors lose money when a unicorn implodes. Ordinary
shareholders, many of them employees, lose too. In fact, because start-ups
often compensate employees with equity, employee shareholders may lose
almost all remuneration for their work when the entity fails.
A. Corporation Law Does Not Protect Unicorn Shareholders
1.

Corporation Law Theory and Practice

One might think that shareholders at WeWork, or any other unicorn,

80. Paige Leskin et al., SoftBank-Backed Startups are Bleeding, as Investors Tighten up
Scrutiny over Loss-Making Business Models, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2020, 3:50 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/running-list-softbank-investments-2017-7 [https://perma.c
c/NLW9-GL75] (providing a list of SoftBank technology investments); see Bryan Pietsch,
WeWork’s Valuation has Fallen from $47 Billion Last Year to $2.9 Billion, BUS. INSIDER
(May 18, 2020, 11:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/wework-valuation-falls-47-bil
lion-to-less-than-3-billion-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/L5UK-E5AK] (noting that the valuation
was due in part to the Covid-19 pandemic).
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would be protected by the basic structure of the corporation and the dictates
of corporation law. After all, the corporation concentrates shareholders’
capital in the hands of professional management, the separation of ownership
and control that Berle and Means identified as the defining characteristic of
the modern corporation.81
In the simplest and most idealized terms, shareholders vote for the
board of directors. In turn, the board runs the corporation’s business and
affairs, largely by installing and delegating authority to the executive
officers. The officers are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the
company.82 Thus, in the corporate structure, the “owners” of the corporation
appoint agents who “control” it. This system works because the directors
and officers, and in fact all employees (agents) of the corporation, have
fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the corporation.83 Failure to
fulfill such duties is in principle actionable by either the corporation or its
shareholders.84
This, one might be excused for thinking, ought to be enough to protect
shareholders, and more generally, to foster sound corporate governance,
regardless of whether the company is private or public.
In practice, however, shareholders have few ways to hold corporate
managers accountable for the majority of their decisions. This section
explores some of these problems in the context of unicorns.
2.

Fiduciary Duties Are Hard to Enforce
a.

Derivative Suits

Corporation law relies on the idea of fiduciary duties, but fiduciary
duties can be vague.85 In practice, shareholders’ abilities to vindicate their
rights to fiduciary behavior by the agents running the corporation are

81. ADOLPHE A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY xi (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
83. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (considering a shareholder
derivative suit for directors’ fiduciary duty failure). A full explanation of what is meant by
the “best interests of the corporation,” is beyond the scope or goals of this article.
84. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980) (exploring directors’
business judgment in the context of derivative suits).
85. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Diverging Meaning of Good Faith, 34 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 433, 433 (2009) (noting that defining the fiduciary duties of those who control corporations
and unincorporated business entities has tested the flexibility and resourcefulness of the
Delaware courts).
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limited.86 Firms do not always succeed; business involves risk. Many losses,
including the loss of the firm itself, do not occur because some individual
breached a fiduciary duty. Courts, therefore, are not inclined to see all
business losses as some sort of tort, for which the victim (the investor) is
owed a remedy.87
Suppose, however, a person behaves in a way that harms the
corporation, through a breach of fiduciary duty or otherwise. In the first
instance, it is the responsibility of the board and the executives to address
that harm and (if appropriate) have the corporation seek redress.88 But what
if the board declines to prosecute persons that harm the corporation? What
if it is the board itself, in violation of fiduciary duty, harming the
corporation? In that case, the shareholders have a limited right to sue on
behalf of the corporation in a derivative suit.89 Courts in Delaware and
elsewhere are hostile to such suits, which tend to upend a cardinal precept of
corporation law: the power of the board to run the corporation’s business.90
b.

The Business Judgment Rule

If a derivative suit relates to a business decision made by the board,91
then the “business judgment rule” protects that decision.92 The business
86. See Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605
(2007) (discussing shareholder rights and how they have been affected by statutory provision
and are no longer meaningful); Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 407 (2006) (discussing the decrease in shareholder rights and the
need to establish fundamental rights for shareholders); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response to
Increasing Shareholder Power: Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2006) (arguing the majority view of shareholder rights should be
preserved).
87. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 109, 125–26 (Del. Ch.
2009) (noting that the business judgment rule discourages courts from hindsight evaluation of
director decisions).
88. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932–33 (Del. 1993) (discussing the role of the
board).
89. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (raising the bar for pre-suit
demand excusal in shareholder derivative suits).
90. Id. Ironically, during litigation over SoftBank’s decision not to complete its 2019
agreement to purchase $3 billion of WeWork shares from Neumann and several other
shareholders, the Delaware Court of Chancery took that opportunity to reaffirm the WeWork
board’s supremacy over matters relating to the corporation. In re WeWork Litig., No. CV
2020-0258-AGB, 2020 WL 4917593, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2020).
91. There has been significant scholarly debate regarding the extent to which the business
judgment rule protects corporate officers and executives. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson,
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) (arguing
that the rule should not be applied in suits against officers and executives).
92. Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 625 (2000)
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judgment rule is a judicial presumption that board decisions are informed,
disinterested, and in the best interests of the corporation.93 Courts therefore
will not overturn, or punish management for, such decisions. The business
judgment rule’s presumptions in favor of the board can be rebutted, for
example, by showing an uninformed decision, but rebuttal is difficult.94 Suits
challenging the business judgment of corporate directors or executives fail
most of the time.95 Generally, even questionable corporate decisions, such
as buying a coding bootcamp operator,96 are likely to be protected by the
courts.
c.

Duty of Loyalty: Oversight and Conflicts of Interest

If the suit relates to the board’s oversight of the corporation, corporation
law requires the shareholders to show that the director or executive acted in
bad faith and violated a duty of loyalty to the corporation.97 To extract
compensation on behalf of the corporation, the shareholders must show
grievous lack of supervision by the board.98 Shareholder derivative
complaints based on oversight failures have been called the most difficult to
bring in corporation law,99 and these suits seldom survive an initial motion
to dismiss.100
A fiduciary duty of loyalty violation is slightly easier to establish in
(explaining that the business judgment rule can be understood as a policy of judicial nonreview of board decisions).
93. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
94. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (noting that there is
a powerful presumption in favor of the decisions that a board of director makes).
95. Itai Fiegenbaum, The Controlling Shareholder Enforcement Gap, 56 AM. BUS. L.J.
583, 601–02 (2019) (observing that in most cases, allegations of director negligence will be
dismissed because they fail to overcome the presumptions of the business judgment rule).
96. See Becky Peterson & Meghan Morris, WeWork’s Coding Boot Camp Flatiron
School Has Laid off Dozens of Employees, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 7, 2019, 12:40 PM), https://w
ww.businessinsider.com/weworks-flatiron-school-lays-off-dozens-of-people-2019-11 [https
://perma.cc/LX9U-W2QG] (reporting layoffs at the school).
97. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d. 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (refusing to excuse pre-suit
demand in a shareholder derivative suit relating to board oversight).
98. See Reiter v. Fairbank, C.A. No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823, (Del. Ch. Oct. 18,
2016) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to plead facts that show the directors acted in bad
faith).
99. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(refusing to excuse pre-suit demand in a shareholder derivative suit relating to board
oversight).
100. See Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss – Unmasking Oversight Liability within the
Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 205 (2010) (“Such claims have been
quickly dismissed for engaging in second-guessing of business decisions.”).
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cases of management conflict of interest. For example, what if a CEO buys
buildings and then rents them back to the corporation?101 Fiduciary duty
would seem to prohibit such self-dealing.102
Given the regularity with which conflicts of interest arise, however,
corporation law has developed ways that a corporation may “cleanse” such
transactions. Such “safe harbors” require the informed approval of a
majority of the disinterested directors, informed approval by a majority of
the shareholders, or a judicial finding that the transaction was fair to the
corporation.103 If the corporation jumps through one of these hoops,
shareholder ability to challenge the transaction is limited. Thus, conflicts of
interest like the self-dealing104 and nepotism that attracted attention at
WeWork105 are subject to more exacting corporation law requirements, but
such requirements may not be stringent enough to deter the action.
d.

Procedural Barriers

It is not just the substantive law that makes shareholder derivative suits
difficult to pursue. There are significant procedural barriers as well. The
pre-suit demand requirement in derivative litigation requires shareholders to
“allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain

101. Brown, supra note 7. Conflicts have arisen in other current and former unicorns.
See, e.g., Jeff Montgomery, Six Tesla Directors Settle SolarCity Merger Suit in Del. for $60M,
LAW360 (Jan. 30, 2020, 4:51 PM) (discussing partial settlement of suit against Tesla founder
Elon Musk and his fellow Tesla directors arising from Tesla’s purchase of SolarCity, a
company founded by Musk and two cousins, and in which Musk and five of the Tesla directors
owned substantial stock).
102. See Weinberger v. Uop, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (rejecting a merger for
failing to satisfy the reasonable concept of fair dealing because of conflicts of interest among
the directors). In the case of WeWork, many of the outside directors had conflicts of interest
themselves. Farrell & Brown, supra note 26.
103. See Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006) (stating
that interested director transactions approved pursuant to the Delaware Corporations Law
§144 safe harbor are reviewed under the business judgment rule).
104. Eliot Brown, WeWork’s Long List of Potential Conflicts Adds to Questions Ahead of
IPO, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2019, 6:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/weworks-long-listof-potential-conflicts-adds-to-questions-ahead-of-ipo-11567808023 [https://perma.cc/UF7T2WG7] (noting a corporate culture rife with conflicts of interest and a lack of accountability).
105. Neumann is reported to have toasted “to nepotism” at a WeWork retreat. See Farrell
& Brown, supra note 26 (reporting that children of board members were hired by WeWork);
see also Eliot Brown et al., WeWork Cleans House, Looks to Trim Staff Close to Ex-CEO, Sell
Private Jet, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2019, 3:13 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/weworkcleans-house-looks-to-trim-staff-close-to-ex-ceo-sell-private-jet-11569531640 [https://perm
a.cc/N5LR-VJ3H] (noting that, in the wake of Neumann’s stepping down as CEO, the new
leaders had plans to fire nearly twenty friends and family members of Neumann and his wife).
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the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority
and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the
plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”106 In a
pleading (pre-discovery) context, this is difficult.107 Because a request to the
board to file suit (against its own members or its appointed executives) is
likely to produce a negative answer, which is then protected by the business
judgement rule, shareholders tend to seek excusal of the pre-suit demand
requirement.108 In order to be excused from making a demand upon the
board, however, shareholders must show that demand would have been
futile,109 which is another high hurdle.110 And finally, even if directors are
shown to have violated their fiduciary duties, many corporations have
exculpation,111 indemnification, and/or insurance112 measures that protect
directors, further weakening the deterrent effect of corporation law penalties.
Thus, despite corporation law provisions requiring executives and
directors to act in the unicorn’s best interests, shareholders are far from
protected by the law and have a limited ability to obtain a remedy even if
they are able to show bad behavior.
Nevertheless, on November 4, 2019, a WeWork minority shareholder
and former employee filed a class action and derivative complaint against
Neumann, WeWork directors, and SoftBank.113 The complaint alleges that
106. Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1(a).
107. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991) (holding that the
demand requirement in Rule 23.1 “speaks only to the adequacy of the shareholder
representative’s pleadings”).
108. See Collins J. Seitz, Jr.& S. Michael Sirkin, The Demand Review Committee: How It
Works, and How It Could Work Better, 73 BUS. LAW. 305, 317 (2018) (arguing for a
conditional demand in order to ameliorate the “harsh consequences” of a stockholder making
a demand).
109. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932–33 (Del. 1993). The Model Business
Corporations Act, which reflects practices in a number of other (non-Delaware) states,
requires the pre-suit demand. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §7.42 (2016).
110. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
111. See Julian Velasco, The Diminishing Duty of Loyalty, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1035,
1090–91 (2018) (calling exculpation provisions “ubiquitous”).
112. See 4 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§15:21 (3d ed. 2019) (delineating a basic overview of director indemnification and insurance).
113. See First Amended Shareholder Class Action and Derivative Complaint, Carter v.
Neumann (No. CGC-19-580474) (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 2020) (arguing that Adam Neumann,
the We Company board, and SoftBank are working in concert with one another to the benefit
of themselves and the detriment of We Company’s minority shareholders); see also Theron
Mohamed, A Former WeWork Employee Is Suing Over Adam Neumann’s $1.7 Billion Golden
Parachute, Bus. Insider (Nov. 9, 2019), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/we
work-ex-employee-sues-adam-neumann-2-billion-leaving-deal-2019-11-1028675038 [https:
//perma.cc/S76A-2MF3] (detailing the original complaint filed by Natalie Sojka, which was
later combined with others and amended).
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Neumann, Softbank, and the WeWork board members (whom the complaint
described as “supine”)114 breached their fiduciary duties. The complaint
alleges that the board approved self-dealing transactions like WeWork
leasing space in buildings that Neumann owned and purchasing the “We
Company” name from Neumann115 and provided “massive” loans on
commercially unreasonable terms to Neumann.116 The derivative suit also
emphasizes the fact that, because WeWork is a private company which failed
to hold annual meetings for several years, minority shareholders had only
limited information about the company.117 The suit emphasizes the adverse
financial impact on the minority shareholders, whose stock and options have
lost most or all of their value.118
3.

Problems with Board Independence and Diversity
a.

Founder Dominance and Multi-Class Share Structures

Unicorn shareholders might seek judicial enforcement of fiduciary
duties because they cannot get satisfaction through corporate governance,
i.e., electing a board that will look out for their interests.119 In many cases,
corporation law does not ensure adequate unicorn governance because the
founder(s) dominate such start-ups, often serving as chief executive and a
board member (perhaps chair).120 It is also common for all of the board
members to be friendly with the founder, who is likely to hold the majority
114. First Amended Shareholder Class Action and Derivative Complaint, Carter v.
Neumann, supra note 113, para. 58.
115. First Amended Shareholder Class Action and Derivative Complaint, Carter v.
Neumann, supra note 113, para. 48–9.
116. First Amended Shareholder Class Action and Derivative Complaint, Carter v.
Neumann, supra note 113, para. 78.
117. First Amended Shareholder Class Action and Derivative Complaint, Carter v.
Neumann, supra note 113, para. 13–14.
118. First Amended Shareholder Class Action and Derivative Complaint, Carter v.
Neumann, supra note 113, para. 68.
119. Much has been written about the fact that shareholder voting may be ineffective in a
large corporation.
LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 4 (Carolina Academic Press, 2011).
120. In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 553 (Del. Ch. 2003) (involving a
shareholder challenge to a management buy-out in which the chief proponent was the founder,
CEO, and board chair who controlled approximately 40% of the company’s voting equity);
N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund v. infoGROUP, Inc., No. Civ.A. 5334-VCN, 2011 WL
4825888, at *4, *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2011) (determining that a board lacked independence in
connection with a merger transaction based on allegations that the company’s founder, former
CEO, and director owned approximately 37% of the company’s stock and pressured the board
to sell the company under sub-optimal circumstances due to a personal liquidity concern).
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of the voting shares.121 Board members may be founder family members,122
or representatives of early investors such as venture capital firms,123 who are
bullish on the entity and its management.124 Some WeWork directors
reportedly saw themselves more as advisers than as persons with oversight
and decision-making responsibility.125
The rise of these founder-dominated unicorns, especially in the
technology sector, has been accompanied by a resurgence of multi-class
share systems.126 This problem is not entirely new, nor restricted to privately

121. See Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 200–09 (2019)
(discussing board monitoring failures in the startup context).
122. For example, Elon Musk’s brother, Kimbal Musk, has long served on the board of
the former unicorn, Tesla. Tom Hals, Tesla Directors Settle, Isolating Musk as SolarCity
Trial Looms, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-solarcity-law
suit/tesla-directors-settle-isolating-musk-as-solarcity-trial-looms-idUSKBN1ZT2HF [https://
perma.cc/S3PX-7CBG].
123. Until the SoftBank shakeup following the cancelled IPO, the WeWork board included
Neumann, as well as Softbank executive Ron Fisher; Rhone Capital CEO Steven Langman;
former Goldman Sachs executive Mark Schwartz; Lew Frankfort, former CEO of handbag
maker Coach; Bruce Dunlevie, the CEO of Benchmark Capital, and John Zhao, CEO of Hony
Capital. David Jeans, Three WeWork Board Members to Depart, Another to Follow,
THEREALDEAL (Feb. 6, 2020), https://therealdeal.com/national/2020/02/06/exclusive-three-w
ework-board-members-depart-another-to-follow/amp/ [https://perma.cc/9PBK-8C7D].
124. See Charles Duhigg, supra note 16 (discussing how Bruce Dunlevie joined the
WeWork board and admitted to a partner that he was taken with Neumann but did not know
how WeWork would ever make a profit). This “bullish” attitude is most clearly demonstrated
by unicorn valuations. Brett Ryder, WeWork Shows Why Some Venture Capitalists are in a
World of Make-Believe, ECONOMIST (Sept. 28, 2019) www.economist.com/business/2019/09
/28/wework-shows-why-some-venture-capitalists-are-in-a-world-of-make-believe [https://pe
rma.cc/SX6Y-97N7] (“It is the venture-capital industry that helps spin the invisible yarn that
creates the legends. Some of its biggest names, such as SoftBank, have been peddling
valuations of companies like WeWork that border on the absurd”). Pavel Alpeyev et al.,
SoftBank Unveils $9.5 Billion WeWork Rescue, Gets 80% Stake, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2019)
(suggesting that people are suspicious of actual valuations of unicorn companies).
125. Farrell & Brown, supra note 26. Bill Gurley, a partner at WeWork venture capital
investor Benchmark Capital, has described the struggles of venture firms to balance their
duties as board members with their need to foster close relationships with founders: “Silicon
Valley has become so competitive in the venture capital market that the level of discipline
invoked from the board is just not there.” Winkler, supra note 41. There were a number of
internal problems at WeWork that should have concerned the WeWork board members, and
some of the company’s collateral ventures seemed “outlandish,” but the board approved
nearly all of Neumann’s proposals. Duhigg, supra note 16.
126. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 594 (2017) (arguing that there has been an upward trend in the
adoption of dual-class stock since Google went public with a dual-class structure in 2004,
followed by well-known tech companies, such as Facebook, Groupon, LinkedIn, Snap, Trip
Advisor, and Zynga).
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held companies. Henry Ford used dual-class shares.127 But the use of dualclass shares to ensure founder domination has reached a new prominence.128
In 2019, over 38% of technology IPOs and over 22% of all IPOs had dualclass share structures.129
By holding super-voting shares (shares that get three or five or 10 or
even 20 votes-per-share),130 unicorn founders and their friends ensure
complete control of the company: the right to appoint all of the directors131
and to green-light even fundamental transactions that normally would
require broad-based shareholder approval. In many cases such as Facebook
and Alphabet, founder voting control persists even once the firms have
moved into the public markets.132 This control, vested in a small cadre of
127. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 700 (1985) (discussing Ford’s use
of dual-class shares). Ironically, Neumann has been compared to Henry Ford in his effort to
transform the workplace. Sam Walker, WeWork’s Adam Neumann Was Right About One
Thing: Someone Needs to Reinvent Work, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/weworks-adam-neumann-was-right-about-one-thing-someone-needs-to-reinvent-w
ork-11569038406 [https://perma.cc/9D4C-TPEM].
128. See, e.g., Maureen Farrell, In Snap IPO, New Investors to Get Zero Votes, While
Founders Keep Control, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-snapipo-new-investors-to-get-zero-votes-while-founders-keep-control-1484568034 [https://perm
a.cc/2QSU-SGBA] (“Between 2012 and 2016, roughly 19% of U.S. tech firms that went
public did so with dual-class structures—more than double the share over the prior five-year
period.”).
129. Ritter, supra note 74.
130. Facebook’s multi-class shares include Class B shares, controlled by founder Mark
Zuckerberg and a small group of insiders, totaling about 18% of the shares, but with 10 votesper-share. Bob Pisani, Shareholders Won’t Force Zuckerberg’s Hand in Facebook
Management, CNBC (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/20/shareholders-wontforce-zuckerbergs-hand-in-facebook-management.html
[https://perma.cc/M245-2QKT].
Alphabet (Google) has three classes of stock, but it is the B Shares, controlled by insiders
Larry Page, Sergey Brin and Eric Schmidt, that control over 60 percent of the voting shares
with 10 votes-per-share. The publicly traded Class A shares have only one vote-per-share
(GOOGL) and the other publicly traded shares, Class C (GOOG), have no voting rights. Id.
131. See Matt Levine, We Wants a New Boss, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-23/we-wants-a-new-boss [https://per
ma.cc/LDE2-NMDW] (explaining that thanks to the supervoting shares, Neumann controlled
all the votes and so had the power to fire the entire board, though SoftBank’s investment
provided considerable influence).
132. See, e.g., Deepa Seetharaman & Emily Glazer, Mark Zuckerberg Asserts Control of
Facebook, Pushing Aside Dissenters, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/art
icles/mark-zuckerberg-asserts-control-of-facebook-pushing-aside-dissenters-11588106984
[https://perma.cc/G66W-B642] (noting Zuckerberg’s control over eight years after the
company’s IPO); see also Troy Wolverton, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg isn’t accountable
to anyone so it’s time Congress took away the source of his power, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 17,
2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/congress-should-ban-facebooks-dual-class-stock-str
ucture-2018-11?op=1 [https://perma.cc/4LG3-DGTG] (comparing Zuckerberg to an
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managers, has arguably prevented the normal functioning of the corporate
form and has enabled some of the excesses of recent years.133
In the case of WeWork, when the first draft of its Form S-1 was made
public on August 14, 2019, the markets learned that Neumann was holding
super-voting Class B and Class C shares with 20 votes each.134 The proposed
capital structure ensured Neuman’s control of the company not only for his
lifetime, but beyond the grave. At one meeting with the company
employees, Neumann described the company as not, “just controlled – we’re
generationally controlled,” and claimed that “one day, maybe in 100 years,
maybe in 300 years, a great-great-granddaughter of mine will walk into that
room and say, ‘Hey you don’t know me; I actually control the place.’”135
Part of the SoftBank bailout deal in October 2019 was the requirement that
all WeWork shares carry one vote apiece.136
There have been several regulatory initiatives to restrain the use of
multi-class share structures. In 1988, the SEC promulgated Rule 19c-4,
which prohibited exchanges from listing stock of companies that issued dual-

“absolute monarch” who lacks accountability because of the Facebook share structure);
Pollman, supra note 121, at 181–82 (explaining how founder control is established in the preIPO stages of startups).
133. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see generally Westbrook &
Westbrook, supra note 72 (arguing that control by unicorns’ founders and insiders in the
private markets, combined with the dominance of a small number of institutional investors in
the public markets, has produced a concentration of power that may threaten corporate
governance).
134. We Co., supra note 20. The media focused on the August 2019 draft Form S-1
revelation that Neumann controlled the majority of voting rights through the company’s Class
B and Class C shares, with both classes carrying 20 votes-per-share compared with Class A
shares, which have one vote-per-share. Annie Palmer, WeWork’s Valuation Could Fall to
Below $15 billion in IPO, Down From $47 billion Private Valuation, CNBC (Sep. 13, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/13/wework-makes-sweeping-corporate-governance-changes
-ahead-of-ipo.html [https://perma.cc/Q4ZK-ZKPC]. In an amended Form S-1 filed
September 13, 2019, WeWork claimed it was changing its super-voting stock from 20 votesper-share to 10 votes-per-share, curtailing Neumann’s voting power. We Co., Amendment
No. 2 to Form S-1 Registration Statement (Sept. 13, 2019).
135. Loizos, supra note 12; Meghan Morris, Leaked Video Reveals Adam Neumann Told
Staff Earlier This Year That His Family Had 100% Control of WeWork and That Even in 300
Years His Descendants Would Be in Control, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.bus
inessinsider.com/wework-adam-neumann-said-family-control-company-300-years-january2019-10 [https://perma.cc/ZMV9-TXTT]; see also Platt & Edgecliffe-Johnson, supra note 13
(reporting Neumann hoped to keep the company in his family’s control for generations). As
mentioned, this control is not necessarily curbed by a public offering. Google, LinkedIn,
Groupon, Zyna, Facebook, Wayfair, Match and Snap, to name just a few, went public with
dual-class shares preserving founder voting control. See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note
70, at 871–80.
136. See Farrell & Brown, supra note 26 (detailing the SoftBank bailout).
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class shares.137 That rule was removed after the Business Roundtable, a nonprofit association of chief executives of major U.S. companies,138
successfully challenged it as beyond the SEC’s power.139 In response to
recent scandals and objections, stoked by the Snap (non-voting shares)
IPO,140 several indexes have restricted new listings by companies with dualclass share structures.141 This may indicate a shift in market tolerance for
such arrangements,142 but they remain commonly used by unicorns.143
137. Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed. Reg, 26,376,
26,394 (1988), codified at 17 CFR §240.19c-4 (1990).
138. About Us, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us [ht
tps://perma.cc/G8MV-MH3D] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
139. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the
SEC lacked statutory authority to prohibit exchanges from listing stock of corporations which
nullify, impair, or disparately reduce per share voting rights of common shareholders). For a
full discussion of the rule and the Business Roundtable’s case, see generally Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 565 (1991)
(explaining the motivation for the promulgation of the rule).
140. See generally Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 70 (walking through the Snap
IPO, other IPOs by companies with dual-class share structures, and both regulatory and
market reactions to those structures). Following its IPO, Snap was involved in a protracted
legal fight with investors over allegedly faulty growth metrics ahead of the offering. That
litigation was settled for $187.5 million in February 2020. Tyler Sonnemaker, Snap Says It
Agreed to a $187.5 Million Settlement in a Lawsuit Where Investors Said That the Company
Understated Snapchat’s Threat from Instagram, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.b
usinessinsider.com/snap-budgets-100-million-preliminary-settlement-ipo-class-action-lawsu
it-2020-2 [https://perma.cc/7JJ5-3D4E] (noting that the DOJ and SEC dropped their
investigation over the matter in 2019).
141. “Tracking stocks and companies with multiple share class structures are NOT eligible
for the S&P Composite 1500 and its component indices.” S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P
U.S. INDICES: METHODOLOGY 6 (2019), https://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/
methodology-sp-us-indices.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LLN-2GF6]; see also Joanna Ossinger,
Goldman Gives New Reason IPOs May Suffer: Multi-Class Shares, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30,
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-30/goldman-gives-another-reaso
n-ipos-may-suffer-multi-class-shares [https://perma.cc/MTX5-P9K8] (noting that firms
restricted for joining major indices will miss out on flows from passive investment managers
tracking those benchmarks).
142. The August 2019 draft Form S-1 also claimed Neumann’s super-voting shares would
be reduced to 10 votes-per-share if he did not donate a least $1 billion to charity within 10
years of the planned IPO. See Andrea Vittorio, WeWork Links Co-Founder’s Voting Rights
to Charity Giving Goal, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/XBR82N50000000?bna_news_filter=corporate-law&jcsearch=BNA%252000000
16c96dddeaea97ff6df24490001#jcite [https://perma.cc/TRW5-YGYC] (reporting that
investors opposed to founder-favoring dual-class share structures have been pushing
companies like Lyft and Pinterest to add sunset provisions to their arrangements).
143. For a defense of dual-class share structures, see Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private
Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to Use Dual-Class Share Structures in IPOs, 63
VILL. L. REV. 1, 26–31 (2018) (discussing the regulatory history of class share structures and
arguing that they provide an optimal corporate governance scheme). For a more innovative
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Lack of Diversity in Unicorn Boards (and Financing)

The technology sector, where most unicorns are found, long has been
criticized for its “boys’ club” mentality, with regard to both investment and
operations.144 Founder dominance often exacerbates and is exacerbated by
the lack of gender diversity on unicorn boards. Most unicorns lack even a
single woman director. Fewer than 10% of unicorn board seats are held by
women.145 Consonantly, in 2019, only about 14% of venture-capital deals
funded companies with at least one woman founder, and less than 3% of the
deals were with all-female-founded firms.146 A management structure
dominated by a small number of similar persons may be expected to foster
groupthink.147 Lacking the variety of strengths and capabilities of a diverse
group of directors, unicorn boards may circumscribe their decision-making
capacity.148
This problem is in part enabled by the fact that several of a unicorn’s
directors are usually appointed by venture capitalists, who are
approach, see also Lawrence Cunningham, Quality Shareholder Voting, THE CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (Nov. 21, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/11/21/quality-shareholdervoting/ [https://perma.cc/J36L-KDFJ] (proposing a “Quality Shareholder Voting” approach
that would increase the voting power of long-term shareholders by adding votes to shares
based on holding periods and high concentrations).
144. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Investment Funds, Inequality, and Scarcity of Opportunity,
99 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1043–44 (2019) (noting that 75% of venture capital firms have never
had a senior woman investor). This is contrasted with the fact almost all Fortune 500 company
boards have at least one female director. See Claire Zillman & Emma Hinchliffe, WeWork
Rent the Runway, Heidi Cruz, Cyan Banister: Broadsheet October 19, FORTUNE (Oct. 19,
2018), http://fortune.com/2018/10/19/wework-rent-the-runway-heidi-cruz-cyan-banister-bro
adsheet-october-19/ [https://perma.cc/3VXZ-FYLY] (noting the conflicting feelings that
many majority board members have regarding the push toward board diversification). But
see Allyson Kapin, Women-Led Startups Are Tearing Down the Boys’ Club, FORBES (Mar.
31, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allysonkapin/2019/03/31/women-led-startups-are-te
aring-down-the-boys-club/#a2924147b6e3 [https://perma.cc/R5ZD-4JY9] (noting that Rent
the Runway and Glossier had just achieved unicorn status).
145. According to Boardlist, as of June 30, 2017, only 8.75% of unicorn board seats were
held by women. Women on Unicorn Boards, BOARDLIST, https://theboardlist.com/research
[https://perma.cc/D26H-CLCB] (last visited Feb. 28, 2020).
146. See PITCHBOOK & NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, VENTURE MONITOR 4Q 2019, 24
https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/Q4_2019_PitchBook_NVCA_Venture_Monito
r.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA5V-63AZ] (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (pointing out that these low
numbers represented an increase from 2018 levels).
147. See IRVING LESTER JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 2–3 (1972) (analyzing the decisions that are made
when there is a close-knit body seeking consensus under strong leadership).
148. See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How
Much Difference Does Difference Make? 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 394–401 (2014) (evaluating
arguments for and studies relating to racial, ethnic, and gender diversity on corporate boards).
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overwhelmingly male.149 A 2018 report noted that nearly 75% of venture
capital firms had no women partners.150 In fact, homogeneity in venture
capital firms is not confined to gender. According to another report, in 2018,
82% of venture capital investors were male, 70% were white, and 40% of
them went to either Harvard or Stanford.151 Drawn from a small pool, many
of the powerful152 financing sources for unicorns present “one-sided
sentiment.”153 This risks positive feedback for even the most erratic unicorn
management.
In August 2019, the WeWork board included Neumann and six other
men affiliated with WeWork investors.154 The other board members have
been described as “mesmerized” by Neumann, and they did not impose much
restraint: “[l]ittle of WeWork’s trajectory would have been possible were it
not for the collection of veteran executives and financiers from the upper
echelons of Wall Street and Silicon Valley who enabled Mr. Neumann.”155
The board shakeup following the failed IPO resulted in the appointment of
an array of new investor representatives, including a female Softbank
executive.156
149. Silicon Valley has been described as a “boys’ club” with limited opportunities for
women. See EMILY CHANG, BROTOPIA: BREAKING UP THE BOYS’ CLUB OF SILICON VALLEY
40 (2018) (suggesting that the lack of diversity negatively impacts decision-making); see also
Pollman, supra note 121, at 173 (discussing the rights of venture capital investors).
150. See Cromwell Schubarth, More VC Forms Have Women Partners But Nearly 75%
Have None, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/bizwomen/
news/latest-news/2019/01/more-vc-firms-have-women-partners-but-most-have.html [https:
//perma.cc/6CBN-BQCV] (noting that the “overwhelming majority” of venture money is
going to startups that have no women on the founding team).
151. Richard Kerby, Where Did You Go to School? NOTEWORTHY – THE JOURNAL BLOG
(July 30, 2018), https://blog.usejournal.com/where-did-you-go-to-school-bde54d846188 [htt
ps://perma.cc/S7PP-HCTJ].
152. See Ilya A. Strebulaev & Will Gornall, How Much Does Venture Capital Drive the
U.S. Economy?, INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/in
sights/how-much-does-venture-capital-drive-us-economy
[https://perma.cc/Y8UU-FJ5A]
(noting that a fifth of current public U.S. companies received venture capital financing).
153. Fried & Gordon, supra note 69.
154. See supra note 123 (listing 2019 board members).
155. Farrell & Brown, supra note 26.
156. In 2020, Softbank executive Ron Fisher, Rhone Capital CEO Steven Langman,
former Goldman Sachs executive Mark Schwartz, and Lew Frankfort, former CEO of
handbag maker Coach, left or were expected to leave the board. Their places were taken by
WeWork’s newly appointed CEO Sandeep Mathrani, SoftBank executives Kirthiga Reddy
and Marcelo Claure (as chairman), and Jeff Sine, a partner of the Raine Group. Jeans, supra
note 123. However, in part due to the ongoing litigation relating to SoftBank’s decision not
to pursue the tender offer reported in fall 2019, new directors have been added to the board,
but several of the original directors remained. See Konrad Putzier, WeWork Directors Sue
SoftBank Over Terminated $3 Billion Share Offer, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.
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B. Securities Law Does Not Protect Unicorn Investors
1.

Securities Law Theory and Practice
a.

Historical Background

Classically, startups raise money (and compensate employees) by
issuing equity, shares of stock. Those shareholders are participants in
corporate governance, and their rights and privileges are governed by state
corporation laws, discussed in the preceding section. But shares are also
securities, and investors in securities (stocks, bonds, and many other
instruments) are protected by the securities laws, most of which are
federal.157
Most large companies—which, in the course of their history, raise
capital by issuing securities to the public—are disciplined by securities
laws.158 Those laws were designed during the Great Depression and in direct
response to the stock market crash of 1929.159 They are based on the
understanding that ordinary people, including the most uninformed and
vulnerable investors (“widows and orphans”)160 might be persuaded, often
fraudulently, to buy stock in companies without appreciating the risks.161

wsj.com/articles/wework-directors-sue-softbank-over-terminated-3-billion-share-offer-1158
6271317#:~:text=Konrad%20Putzier,-Biography&text=Two%20WeWork%20directors%2
0filed%20a,%243%20billion%20in%20WeWork’s%20shares.&text=The%20board%20is%
20made%20up,Dunlevie%20and%20former%20Coach%20Inc [https://perma.cc/WLX3-9K
R8] (explaining Lew Frankfort and Bruce Dunlevie’s roles in the litigation); see also Jef
Feeley, WeWork Board Factions Head for Clash Over New Directors, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(May 28, 2020, 8:14 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-governance/weworkboard-factions-head-for-clash-over-new-directors?context=search&index=1 [https://perma.c
c/XSJ9-LDR7] (outlining plans to appoint the new directors, and the litigation). It is unclear
whether minority shareholders will benefit from the new management.
157. See 4 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 27:3 (3d ed. 2019) (outlining the role of state “blue sky” laws).
158. See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 72, at 704–12 (describing the emergence of
securities law and the resulting effects on the conduct of business).
159. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 408 (1990) (noting that the public blamed the Stock Market Crash
for the Great Depression, which made substantial legislation to regulate stock exchanges
inevitable).
160. See Adam C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement? 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1073, 1085 (2005) (noting the SEC’s focus on protecting vulnerable and uninformed
investors).
161. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.ht
ml#create [https://perma.cc/X88V-R5BN] (last updated Oct. 15, 2020) (overview of the SEC
functions and responsibilities).
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Consequently, Congress imposed an anti-fraud and mandatory disclosure
regime. By requiring companies to provide information material to
investment decisions and punishing their failure to do so as securities fraud,
Congress hoped both to protect investors and to ensure the soundness of
securities markets, which in turn would foster the formation of investment
capital.162 In broad outline, the federal securities law seem to have worked
pretty well.163
Under this regime, in order to raise money in the public markets (by,
for example, offering stock to the public) companies must register with the
SEC, detailing the investment in a registration statement, which is made
available to the public. After the IPO, the company is required to file
periodic reports, which are also made available to the public.164 Going public
has traditionally been understood to offer numerous advantages to a
company: a relatively cheap way to raise large amounts of capital; liquidity
for founders; a currency with which the company could pursue acquisitions;
and a signal to the market that the company was mature.165 In exchange, a
company accepts the costs of the transition, including the discipline of
mandatory public accounting, enforced by antifraud remedies.166
b.

The Public-Private Distinction

Securities law generally distinguishes between public transactions,
which are subject to extensive regulation, and non-public, or “private,”

162. See Thel, supra note 159 (explaining the background of the federal securities laws
and the drive to prevent and punish misleading information provided to investors, which could
foster sound, long-term investment).
163. See e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1416 (1999) (finding disclosure
on the whole beneficial). But see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2376 (1998) (finding that mandatory
disclosure is not effective).
164. What we commonly refer to as a “public” company is required to file periodic reports
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). Reporting company status
may be triggered by listing securities on a national exchange (Exchange Act § 12(a)),
exceeding the 2000 shareholder cap along with having over $10 million in assets (Exchange
Act § 12(g)), or engaging in a registered public offering – often of debt securities (Exchange
Act § 15(d)). See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 205 (5th ed. 2019) (summarizing the three categories of public companies under
the Exchange Act).
165. See Jones, supra note 57, at 170 (outlining the advantages typically associated with
going public).
166. See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 72 at 711–12 (describing the legal
obligations that accompany growth via public offerings).
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transactions, which are much less heavily regulated.167 This distinction often
corresponds to a company’s size. To understand why, consider the easy case
of a small company that distributes shares to its investors. A traditional
assumption has been that there is little risk of a small company harming its
unknowing investors or the economy as a whole.168 Its investors, perhaps
friends or family, are in a position to know the managers personally, and
therefore may be informed enough about the risks and opportunities
presented by the investment to fend for themselves.169 Wealthy or very
sophisticated investors tend to be similarly knowledgeable, albeit for
different reasons. They generally are in a position to bargain for information,
may employ their own lawyers, accountants and other experts, and therefore
have little need for information required in compliance with the mandatory
disclosure regime of the securities laws.170
From an investor protection standpoint, until a company begins to affect
a wider constituency of investors (“widows and orphans”), who may be
swindled out of their savings, it is inefficient, if not inappropriate, to expend
government resources enforcing most of the securities law disclosure and
trading rules.171 And, from the perspective of the company itself, compliance
with the securities laws would impose a great cost. Therefore, generally
speaking, transactions in the securities of small companies, or securities
offered to sophisticated investors, are deemed “transaction[s] not involving
any public offering” and are exempted from the reporting and registration
requirements imposed on large corporations and their securities.172 These
are so-called private offerings. In contrast, the federal securities laws are
primarily concerned with securities offered by large corporations to the

167. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) generally prohibits the
offer of securities without registration with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2020). Section
4(a)(2) of the Securities Act exempts “transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering” from the registration requirements of Section 5. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
168. See H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, at 5–7 (1933) (supporting the distinction of public
transactions since the inception of U.S. securities law, stemming from the concept that private
transactions do not affect the national economy because they are limited in scope and effect).
169. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (discussing whether investors
can “fend for themselves” in the context of determining whether an offer is public).
170. See infra Section II.B.2.a (discussing the definition of Accredited Investors).
171. See Pritchard, supra note 160, at 1085 (noting that many investors may be able to
protect themselves, but that the SEC usually focuses on the stereotypical “widows and
orphans” in designing and enforcing protections). As discussed below in Part V.B.1, the basic
antifraud rules are an exception to this and apply to purchases and sales of any securities
(public or private).
172. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125–26 (1953) (establishing the criteria for
the private offering exemption under Securities Act Section 4(a)(1)).
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broader public and traded by members of the public.173
Unicorns are, by definition, privately held. It is possible to argue that
unicorn investors are privately approached and almost always able to get the
information that they need, and so they can fend for themselves.174 No
registration is necessary, but governance may be expected to be informal.
Then, when the companies finally access the deeper capital of the public
markets, when the risks of their operations begin to impact the public at
large, federal securities regulation steps in to require disclosure and other
formalities like GAAP financials. A public offering makes companies play
by the book. This, the comforting narrative goes, is what happened with
WeWork.175 While it remained private, all sorts of irregularities took place.
When it tried to go public, WeWork encountered the “buzz saw” of the
equity markets and was forced to reorganize.176
Although this story has a certain traditional force, it does not adequately
capture what happened at WeWork or, more generally, the reality of the
financial markets today. Given their scale and their potential for harm,
unicorns clearly need stricter corporate governance.
All of the
counterarguments rely on the longstanding distinction between public and
private companies, and the tacit but no longer valid assumption that private
companies are relatively small.177 As discussed above, the term “unicorn” is
173. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of
the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 453 (2017) (observing that most federal securities
regulation targets publicly traded equities and their corporate issuers).
174. The definition is “intended to encompass those persons whose financial
sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of loss of investment or ability to fend for
themselves render the protections of the Securities Act’s registration process unnecessary.”
Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act
Release No.33-6683, 52 Fed. Reg. 3015, 3017 (Jan. 16, 1987).
175. See, e.g., Fred Wilson, The Great Public Market Reckoning, AVC (Sept. 29, 2019)
https://avc.com/2019/09/the-great-public-market-reckoning/ [https://perma.cc/3H3K-RX2
W] (summarizing the bottom line as “[t]he public markets are a lot different than the private
markets”). But see Esha Dey et al., Unprofitable Companies Are Raising the Most IPO Cash
Since the Dot-Com Era, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.co
m/graphics/2019-unprofitable-ipo-record-uber-wework-peloton/ [https://perma.cc/6Z2H-JE
GW] (noting the amount of cash raised in IPOs by unicorns such as Uber, Lyft, and Peloton
in 2019).
176. Erin Griffith, Silicon Valley Is Trying Out a New Mantra: Make a Profit, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/technology/silicon-valley-startup-profi
t.html [https://perma.cc/H22T-M8NN] (identifying the “buzz saw” of Wall Street); see also
Justin Lahart, Public Markets Expose the Myth of the Unicorn, WALL ST. J (May 23, 2019,
12:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/public-markets-expose-the-myth-of-the-unicorn11558627761 [https://perma.cc/9AZB-SBS8] (noting problems encountered by Uber,
Pinterest, Lyft and WeWork).
177. See de Fontenay, supra note 173, at 463 (noting an increase in the threshold size at
which public company status becomes desirable).

2021]

WE('RE) WORKING ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

539

less than a decade old.178 Today, however, with the advent of enormous
private companies, the line between public and private companies is blurry.
To make matters worse, relatively recent regulatory and technology changes
have substantially weakened the application of the securities laws and,
consequently, their ability to ensure responsible corporate governance in
unicorns.179
2.

The Private Placement Exception Has Swallowed the
Registration Rule 180
a.

Reg D/Rule 506/Accredited Investors

The question of what constitutes “a public offering” requiring
registration is central to securities regulation. In order to reduce ambiguity,
the SEC has created safe harbor measures that companies can rely on to
ensure they do not trigger reporting company obligations with particular
offerings. In the unicorn context, the critical safe harbor is Regulation D’s
Rule 506.181 Regulation D private placements are popular for good reason.
As long as a unicorn abides by its safe harbor rules, the offering will not be
deemed public and thereby trigger expensive registration and reporting
requirements.182

178. See Lee, supra note 27 (popularly credited with coining the term).
179. See Jones, supra note 57, at 170 (describing a class of unaccountable unicorns
emerging from the JOBS Act and similar reforms).
180. See de Fontenay, supra note 173, at 467 (calling the Accredited Investor designation
“the exception that swallows the rule”).
181. Regulation D was promulgated in 1982. Revision of Certain Exemptions from
Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Orders and Sales, Securities Act Release No.
33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11, 251 (Mar. 8, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230, 239). It
currently includes Rules 504 and 506. Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-10238, 81 Fed. Reg. 83494 (Nov. 21,
2016) (repealing Rule 505). Rule 504 is of limited utility to unicorns because of the $5 million
cap on the amount of securities that can be sold to investors. 17 C.F.R § 230.504 (2019).
182. Companies relying on an exemption from registration of securities under Rule 506
must file a Form D with the SEC within 15 calendar days of the date of the first sale for each
new offering of securities. Form D. Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SGBYVDU]. However, that document includes only a fraction of the information required of
public companies. See Investor Bulletin: Private Placements under Regulation D, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, (Sept. 24, 2014) https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_pri
vateplacements.html [https://perma.cc/JS32-R9B4] (warning that private placements are not
subject to some of the laws and regulations that are designed to protect investors, such as the
comprehensive disclosure requirements that apply to registered offerings).
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Companies are increasingly doing just that and staying private longer.183
Start-ups are accessing a historically deep and broad pool of capital with little
regulatory scrutiny.184 Approximately 99.9% of reported private market
capital raised since 2009 has relied on Rule 506.185 WeWork had raised
capital eleven times using Rule 506 before it withdrew its registration request
in September 2019.186 Arguably, the lack of accountability imposed by the
private financings enabled WeWork to present its financials in a way which
one scholar said, “in aggregate, could be considered misleading.”187
Rule 506 allows a unicorn to raise an unlimited amount of money from
an unlimited number of “Accredited Investors”188 and up to thirty-five other
purchasers.189 As already suggested, the idea behind the Accredited Investor
exception is that a person (legal or natural) with the funds and sophistication
to assess the risk of an investment, and even sustain the loss if it proves
worthless, does not need the full protection of the securities laws.190 Many
183. See discussion in Part I.B (discussing the increasing average time between venturecapital financing and a start-up’s decision to go public).
184. See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 72, at 704–17 (discussing the oversight
resulting from public company status and the increasing access to capital by non-public
companies).
185. SCOTT BAUGUESS ET AL., SEC DIVISION OF ECONOMIC AND RISK ANALYSIS, CAPITAL
RAISING IN THE US: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS,
2009-2017, 13 (Aug. 2018), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/dera_white
_paper_regulation_d_082018 [https://perma.cc/52TM-YT8C].
186. We Co., supra note 36.
187. See Nori Gerardo Lietz, WeWork – The IPO That Shouldn’t?, HARV. BUS. SCH.
WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 18, 2019) https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/wework-the-ipo-that-sho
uldn-t [https://perma.cc/5NZ6-DR49] (noting that WeWork presented the most favorable
outcomes, without providing counterbalancing offsets).
188. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2019) (as amended, effective October 25, 2020).
189. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2019). Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor must
have “such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of
evaluating . . . the merits and risks of the prospective investment.” 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(i)(iii)(2). In addition, with the passage of the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), firms selling unregistered securities under Rule 506 are
also exempted from complying with state securities laws. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2020)). See Ewens & Joan FarreMensa, The Deregulation of the Private Equity Markets and the Decline in IPOs, supra note
73, at 2 (showing that after the passage of NSMIA “late-stage startups are more likely to raise
capital from out-of-state investors than early-stage startups”); see also Linda Gorman,
Regulatory Changes, Private Equity Markets, and the Decline of IPOs, NAT’L BUR. ECON.
RES. DIG., https://www.nber.org/digest/jan20/w26317.shtml [https://perma.cc/4DSA-XTK9]
(Jan., 2020) (noting that startups companies’ access to capital increased following the passage
of NSMIA).
190. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1143, 1158 (2013) (noting the increased proportion of investors that
qualify as accredited investors). Restricting these investment opportunities to relatively
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entities, including banks, registered broker-dealers, insurance companies,
and registered investment companies qualify as Accredited Investors based
on their legal status, and other entities may qualify based on their status and
their assets.191 So, Accredited Investors are often institutions such as banks
and investment companies, and natural persons with fairly high net worth.192
Unicorn investors are, in most cases, all Accredited Investors.193
b.

Traditional Unicorn Investors: Venture Capital and Hedge
Funds

Some funds (often venture capital funds) that have large, early stakes
in unicorns, are made up of relatively few, very wealthy, investors.194
Following the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) in
1996, which raised the threshold for the number of investors that trigger
registration under the Investment Company Act,195 it became easier for
private funds to raise large amounts of money for investment in start-ups.196
At the end of 2017, global private equity assets under management were
estimated at $3.06 trillion.197 In 2018, hedge fund assets were estimated to
affluent investors may be a poor idea as a policy matter. Arguably, the Accredited Investor
limitation contributes to increasing income inequality. See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra
note 72, at 712–15 (discussing securities law’s success at opening equity markets beyond the
wealthy).
191. Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, Proposed Rule, Securities Act
Release No. 33-10738, 85 Fed. Reg. 2332 (proposed Jan. 15, 2020). The rule was amended
in August 2020. Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, Final Rule, Sec. Act Rel.
No. 33-10824; 34-89669 Fed. Reg. 2332 (Aug. 26, 2020).
192. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). If an issuer does not satisfy the Regulation D requirements,
an exemption from registration may still be available under Section 4(a)(2) (a transaction not
involving a public offering), but the uncertainty of that exemption may discourage the issuer.
193. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Opening the Door to Unicorns Invites Risk for Average
Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/your-money/inve
sting-private-market-startups.html [https://perma.cc/66GJ-4VR4] (noting that the SEC’s
proposal to expand the Accredited Investor definition would enable more persons to invest in
unicorns).
194. See Unicorn Hunters: These Investors Have Backed the Most Billion-Dollar
Companies, CB INSIGHTS (May 7, 2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/best-venturecapital-unicorn-spotters-2/ [https://perma.cc/NYR4-NSL4] (cataloging the unicorn
investments of exclusive hedge funds and venture capital funds such as Tiger Global
Management and Sequoia Capital).
195. Investment Company Act 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7).
196. NSMIA removed the 100-investor cap in private placement funds, which triggered
the creation of mega private equity funds. See Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, supra note 73, at
2 (showing that, after NSMIA, “late-stage startups’ ability to raise large funding rounds
increases more than that of their early-stage counterparts”).
197. See James Comtois, Preqin: Private Equity AUM Grows 20% in 2017 to Record
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be at $3.22 trillion.198 These funds have a great deal of money to invest. In
2018, venture capital deal value reached a record $140.2 billion (invested in
10,542 deals), and 2019 was not far behind with $136.5 billion invested in
10,777 deals.199
Such private funds fairly embody the animating conception of the
Accredited Investor, an actor with the sophistication and clout to get good
information, negotiate reasonable deals, and weather the occasional loss,
even if substantial. Such funds are run by sophisticated managers and have
the capacity to negotiate and impact the behavior of the unicorn
companies.200 They may hold preferred shares and negotiate for seats on the
board of directors.201 For example, it was SoftBank that ultimately pushed
out Adam Neumann.202 Venture capital investor Benchmark Capital helped
remove Travis Kalanick from Uber in 2017.203 Even for such funds,
however, better corporate governance would help. Direct investor
involvement in the corporate governance of companies often comes after
heavy losses.204
$3.06 Trillion, PENSIONS & INV. (July 24, 2018, 1:33 PM), https://www.pionline.com/article/
20180724/ONLINE/180729930/preqin-private-equity-aum-grows-20-in-2017-to-record-306
-trillion [https://perma.cc/8AM5-JCXK] (pointing out that the record high was also the result
of the highest annual growth rate recorded by the financial data company Preqin).
198. See Amanda Cantrell, Hedge Fund Assets Hit Record High, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Apr.
19, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b17v773lkvph3y/hedge-fund-assetshit-record-high [https://perma.cc/QCB3-CN4U] (noting the growth despite recent challenges
for hedge funds).
199. NAT. VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, supra note 146.
200. Funds may also be subject to moral hazard because of “IPO ratchet” provisions,
which entitle them to additional shares if the IPO prices below the valuation reflected in the
final private-equity round. Using such provisions, even relatively passive mutual fund
investors are protected from down rounds, at the expense of other (then-diluted) shareholders.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Toxic Unicorns: What Has Been Missed About WeWork’s Fiasco,
THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 6, 2019) (noting that the WeWork prospectus buried
disclosure of an IPO ratchet).
201. The National Venture Capital Association’s Model Investors’ Rights Agreement, for
example, requires companies to provide their “major investors” with regular financial
statements, budgets, and business plans. NAT. VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, Investor Rights
Agreements, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, 5–8, n.7, http://nvca.org/resources/model-legaldocuments/ [https://perma.cc/Y7Q7-A3Q3] (last updated Sept., 2020).
202. Farrell & Brown, supra note 26.
203. Greg Bensinger & Maureen Farrell, How Uber Backers Orchestrated Kalanick’s
Ouster as CEO, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-uber-backer
s-orchestrated-kalanicks-ouster-as-ceo-1498090688?mod=article_inline&mod=article_inlin
e [https://perma.cc/J6HG-T2MB].
204. See supra Part II (discussing SoftBank losses in WeWork). Unicorn founders often
prefer venture capital investors who promise not to interfere or question their decisions. See
Duhigg, supra note 16 (discussing venture capital firms that claim to be “founder friendly”
and relatively hands-off).
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More Unicorn Investors: Direct and Indirect

In the current market, unicorn investors include more than just the
venture capital funds often found in the technology sector. There are also
less active investors,205 such as corporate venture capital funds,206 sovereign
wealth funds, and mutual funds.207
Given the current levels208 of participation in the financial markets,
much of which is through institutional arrangements and retirement plans,209
the idea that public investors are not impacted by unicorn irregularities and
losses may no longer be accurate. Institutional investors, which aggregate
the investments of many smaller investors, accounted for 8% of equity
ownership in 1950, and as much as 80% in 2017.210 Studies estimate that
household equity holdings as a share of disposable income in 2019 were
three times larger than they were in the 1980s.211
205. See Jones, supra note 57, at 173 (noting angel investors are another source of less
active capital). It is also worth noting that the array of investors includes some individual
angel investors, but they are outnumbered by the institutional investors. Id; see also, Ryan
Feit, Searching for the Unicorn Investor, INC. (May 5, 2015) https://www.inc.com/ryan-feit
/searching-for-the-unicorn-investor.html [https://perma.cc/U2FP-Z4ER] (stating that one of
the main reasons companies raise capital online is to combine value-add angel investors with
larger, institutional investors such as venture funds).
206. For a fuller discussion of corporate venture capital, see Jennifer S. Fan, Catching
Disruption: Regulating Corporate Venture Capital, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 341 (2018)
(noting that corporate venture capital has become a powerful force in the field of venture
capital).
207. For a discussion of the problems posed by mutual fund investment in startups, see
Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A Case Study of Fidelity Magellan
Fund’s Investments in Unicorns (and Other Startups) and the Regulatory Implications, 95
N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017) (noting in particular the lack of awareness of and information for
mutual fund investors, and valuation issues).
208. See generally WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE
NOW (2016) (describing the rise of investment management).
209. See Michael Sheetz, More Americans Than Ever Own Stocks, Potentially Giving the
Market a Bigger Wealth Effect, CNBC (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/16/m
ore-americans-than-ever-own-stocks-potentially-giving-the-market-a-bigger-wealth-effect.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/R4NS-VR4U] (noting, however, that the wealthiest 1% still own half of
all total household equities).
210. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Investment Funds, Inequality, and Scarcity of
Opportunity, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1001, 1014 (2019) (describing institutional investors as a
powerful force in global financial markets).
211. See Quentin Fottrell, One Reason Why the Stock Market’s Wild Fluctuations Don’t
Faze Most Americans, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story
/americas-super-wealthy-own-more-stocks-leaving-average-people-in-the-dust-2019-01-28
[https://perma.cc/25KY-Y5KF] (noting that more wealthy Americans own stocks than four
decades ago, though millions have no stake in the markets); see also Sheetz, supra note 209
(citing a study by a Goldman Sachs senior economist).
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The funds in which many ordinary Americans have interests through
their retirement accounts or college savings accounts are the Accredited
Investors that may purchase stakes in unicorns.212 Non-Accredited Investors
can purchase shares in a mutual fund formed to invest in private
companies.213 In fact, all of the major fund groups have funds focused on
private companies.214 “Widows and orphans” are invested in nominally
private markets, they are just invested indirectly.215
This indirect investment may be particularly risky. As mentioned
above, the funds may not be active investors. The defining characteristic of
the largest investment funds, so-called “index funds,” is that they spend few
resources on monitoring and interfering in the corporate governance of their
investment.216 They are structured to be big, diversified, and above all,
passive.217 Their lack of personnel and active management keeps overhead
and fees low, which is good for investors.218 As a matter of corporate
governance, however, these funds are generally along for the ride. Thus,
index funds and their investors are both enablers and victims of bad corporate

212. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Main Street Portfolios Are Investing in Unicorns, N.Y.
TIMES (May 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/main-streetportfolios-are-investing-in-unicorns.html [https://perma.cc/Z8L9-9ZVN].
213. de Fontenay, supra note 173, at 471.
214. See Dawn Lim, Vanguard Broadens Reach with Entry into Private Equity, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 5, 2020) (announcing Vanguard’s launch of a private equity fund, which will be
offered at first only to endowments, foundations, and other institutions). Another example is
the SharesPost 100 Fund, which invests in a variety of late-stage private growth companies
unicorns. See SHARESPOST 100 FUND, ANNUAL REPORT (2018), available at https://sharespo
st.com/downloads/SharesPost_100_Fund_2018_Annual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/296G4M6C] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
215. See Troy Wolverton, WeWork’s meltdown was supposed to leave everyday investors
unharmed. It didn’t, and you probably don’t even realize if your 401(k) took a WeWork hit,
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 11, 2019) https://www.businessinsider.com/mutual-fund-investments-instartups-wework-pose-risks-average-investors-2019-12?IR=T [https://perma.cc/U95Y-8X4
L] (discussing the opportunities and dangers for retail investors who are economically
exposed unicorns like WeWork through mutual fund investments).
216. See David McLaughlin and Annie Massa, Index Fund Takeover Makes ‘Big Three’
into Corporate Overlords, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 9, 2020, 1:40 PM), https://www.bloombergl
aw.com/document/XCBDC45S000000?bna_news_filter=banking-law&jcsearch=BNA%25
200000016f8a8cd182a77fdfdf045d0000#jcite [https://perma.cc/8W2G-7W74] (noting that
on average, Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street own 22% of the typical S&P 500
company).
217. Jones, supra note 57, at 173–74 (noting overall passivity of all unicorn investors,
including not just mutual funds but angel investors, sovereign wealth funds, corporate venture
capital arms, and even, given the competition to fund start-ups, traditional venture capitalists).
218. See Michael Regan, Q&A with Jack Bogle: “We’re in the Middle of a Revolution,”
BLOOMBERG MKTS (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-jack-bogle-i
nterview [https://perma.cc/4R5Y-HEYV] (discussing the merits of passive investing).
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governance.
In addition to the Softbank Vision Fund, WeWork investors included
venture capital firms (Benchmark, DAG Ventures), private equity funds
(Hony Capital), investment funds (T. Rowe Price), and prominent
investment banks (JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs), as well as wealthy
individuals (Mortimer Zuckerman).219 The idea that “public” investors are
not impacted by investments in “private” companies is simply inaccurate.
d. Even More Unicorn Investors: More Accredited Investors
Although the bulk of investment in unicorns is by funds, there are also
individuals. These include so-called angel investors and other high networth individuals. WeWork investors included, for example, billionaire
Mortimer Zuckerman,220 former chairman of Boston Properties and owner of
the New York Daily News.221
In addition, individual Accredited Investors are now much more
common, although hardly democratically representative. In 2019, 13% of
U.S. households qualified as Accredited Investors, up from approximately
2% in 1983.222 In August, 2020, the SEC expanded the Accredited Investor
pool to include more individuals with demonstrated financial
sophistication.223 The changes are intended to expand “investment
opportunities while maintaining appropriate investor protections and

219. See Farrell & Brown, supra note 26 (listing a number of We Co. investors); Alex
Konrad, Inside the Phenomenal Rise of WeWork, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.forbe
s.com/sites/alexkonrad/2014/11/05/the-rise-of-wework/#493d1b456f8b [https://perma.cc/M
8JU-EGP4] (reviewing the history of WeWork).
220. Konrad, supra note 219.
221. #327 Mortimer Zuckerman, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/mortimer-zuck
erman/#22c4e7c2445b [https://perma.cc/8UXB-PC27] (assigning him a real-time net worth
of $2.68 billion as of November 21, 2020) (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
222. Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, 85 Fed. Reg. 2574 (proposed Jan.
15, 2020) (proposing to add new categories of natural persons that may qualify as Accredited
Investors based on their professional knowledge, experience, or certifications, and expanding
the list of entities that may qualify by allowing any entity that meets an investments test to
qualify).
223. Id.; Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, supra note 191; see also
Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, 84 Fed. Reg. 30460
(proposed June 26, 2019) (soliciting comments on exemptions from registration under the
Securities Act of 1933 that enable capital raising). But see Securities and Exchange
Commission, Statement on the Proposed Expansion of the Accredited Investor Definition
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-lee-2019-12-18-accr
edited-investor#_ftn18 [https://perma.cc/8ZTF-Y3DJ] (objecting to certain aspects of the
expansion).
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promoting capital formation.”224
e.

Unicorns May Market Shares Using General Advertising

The 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the JOBS Act) was
passed to encourage IPOs,225 but may simultaneously have made it easier for
some companies to avoid going public.226 For one thing, the JOBS Act
loosened the general solicitation and advertising rules that had prevented
non-public companies from using the internet to seek purchasers for their
securities when pursuing an exempt offering under Rule 506.227 Under the
JOBS Act, the SEC adopted Rule 506(c),228 which allows issuers under Rule
506 to engage in general solicitation as long as the securities are sold only to
Accredited Investors.229 This change has created a wider audience for capital
formation efforts by start-ups.230 The idea makes sense when thinking about
small start-ups, but it also enables large private companies to continue raising
funds without submitting to the financial disclosure and governance
requirements that the public markets would impose.231
224. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Modernizes the Accredited Investor
Definition (Aug. 26, 2020) https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-191 [https://perma.
cc/9PZC-PBLT].
225. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (“An
Act [t]o increase American job creation and economic growth by improving access to the
public capital markets for emerging growth companies”).
226. See de Fontenay, supra note 173, at 456 (claiming that “the JOBS Act simultaneously
liberalized private capital raising . . . rendered nugatory the Act’s efforts to encourage IPOs”).
227. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013). As Regulation D existed before 2013, a sale of securities
that sought the Rule 506 exemption from registration could not use general solicitation or
general advertising to find potential investors. 7 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013). The revisions
to Rule 506(c), however, eliminated that restriction for Rule 506 offerings. Eliminating the
Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A
Offerings 78 Fed. Reg. 44771 (July 24, 2013).
228. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 277–79
(8th ed. 2017) (noting that the SEC was reluctant to make the change but was required to do
so by Congress).
229. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1) (2017). The company is simply required to take reasonable
steps to verify that purchasers are accredited investors. Id. The revised rule also provided
four non-exclusive ways an issuer can meet the “reasonable steps to verify” requirement. See
Michael L. Hermsen, SEC Eliminates General Solicitation and General Advertising
Prohibitions from Certain Private Offerings, MAYER BROWN (July 17, 2013), https://www.m
ayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2013/07/sec-eliminates-general-solicitat
ion-and-general-ad [https://perma.cc/3EAN-8SP5] (discussing the adoption of rule 506).
230. Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV.
561, 585–86 (2015) (explaining the benefits of Title II such as reduction of transaction costs
and addition of passive investors).
231. WeWork’s submission of a confidential Form S-1 on December 31, 2018 relied on
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The JOBS Act also expanded Regulation A to create a crowdfunding
exemption known as “Reg A+,” pursuant to which a private company can
sell up to $20 million (Tier 1) or $50 million (Tier 2) of equity securities to
the general public in a 12-month period with much less burdensome
disclosure requirements and fees (a kind of “mini-IPO”).232 A Tier 2
Regulation A offering imposes more obligations on the issuer, including the
provision of audited financial statements and reporting requirements,233 and
the investors who do not qualify as Accredited Investors are limited to
investing no more than 10% of their annual income or net worth.234
Nevertheless, the expanded exemption provides another opportunity for
companies to raise substantial amounts of capital without going public.
f.

Unicorn Securities May Be Freely Resold after a Year

Traditionally, one of the major reasons to go public has been to create
a liquid secondary market. Securities law restricts resales of private
company securities for which public information is not available. In the
1970s, the SEC created a safe harbor provision that allows secondary market
sales of securities of private companies after a certain holding period under
Rule 144.235 In 2007, however, the SEC reduced that holding period,236 and
its status as an emerging growth company under the JOBS Act (as amended by the FAST Act)
because in the prior fiscal year (2017), its revenues were still less than $1.7 billion. To take
advantage of those reduced disclosure requirements, WeWork submitted the confidential
Form S-1, but that started the clock ticking on a one-year period during which the company
had to consummate the IPO. Many commentators feel that the deadline contributed to
WeWork’s anxiety to get the offering done in 2019. See, e.g., Elie Finegold, WeWork IPO
Part II: Here to Represent the EGC, LINKEDIN (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.linkedin.com/pu
lse/wework-ipo-part-ii-here-represent-egc-elie-finegold
[https://perma.cc/GQ7L-9RCJ]
(explaining the requirements for emerging growth companies under the JOBS Act); Lauren
Silva Laughlin, Adam Neumann’s Ouster Won’t Change WeWork Equation, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 24, 2019, 2:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/adam-neumanns-ouster-wouldnt-ch
ange-wework-equation-11569342629 [https://perma.cc/YA5L-KFNW] (explaining that the
company had to list before the end of 2019 or it would lose its status as an emerging growth
company).
232. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (2019).
233. 17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (2019).
234. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2)(C) (2019).
235. See Definition of the Terms “Underwriter” and “Brokers’ Transactions,” Securities
Act Release No. 33-5223, 37 Fed. Reg. 591 (Jan. 14, 1972) (describing the newly adopted
Rule 144 and how it relates to the application of registration provisions to the resale of
securities).
236. See Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 33-8869, 72 Fed.
Reg. 71,546 (Dec. 17, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144, Persons Deemed Not to Be
Engaged in a Distribution and Therefore Not Underwriters (2018)). For public (reporting)
companies, the holding period is only six months, with conditions on resale during the period
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currently an investor holding stock in a private company can resell that stock
with minimal conditions after twelve months.237 And finding a secondary
market buyer for one’s private company securities is easier than ever.238 For
Rule 144 resales, investors can look to online platforms like SharesPost,239
NASDAQ Private Market,240 Forge Capital,241 and EquityZen.242
In addition to Rule 144, Rule 144A allows immediate resales of certain
restricted (private company) securities to Qualified Institutional Buyers
(QIBs).243 QIBs tend to be large firms, often insurance companies,
investment companies, or banks, that in the aggregate own and invest on a
discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers that are not
affiliated with the entity.244 Rule 144A, which was amended by the JOBS
Act to remove restrictions on general solicitation and advertising, 245 also
between six months to one year from acquisition. For non-reporting companies, the holding
period is one year and, if the resale is effected by a person who is not an affiliate of the issuer,
there are no information requirements after the expiration of the year. See CHOI & PRITCHARD,
supra note 164, at 797 (showing resale requirements in a tabular format).
237. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 164, at 797 (showing resale requirements in a
tabular format).
238. With multiple platform options, over $4 billion in transaction volume was executed
in 2017. See David F. Larker et al., Cashing It In: Private-Company Exchanges and Employee
Stock Sales Prior to IPO, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 9, 2018), https://corpgo
v.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/09/cashing-it-in-private-company-exchanges-and-employee-stoc
k-sales-prior-to-ipo/ [https://perma.cc/AYY7-GYF7] (analyzing transactions on SharesPost,
Equidate (now Forge Capital), EquityZen, and Nasdaq Private Market).
239. See SHARESPOST, https://sharespost.com [https://perma.cc/3YUX-K7H8] (last visited
Nov. 21, 2020) (advertising services for institutional investors, individual investors, selling
shareholders and companies).
240. See Streamline your Liquidity Management with Nasdaq Private Market, NASDAQ,
https://www.nasdaq.com/solutions/nasdaq-private-market
[https://perma.cc/F997-VSZV]
(last visited Nov. 16, 2020) (advertising company provided solutions for private companies
and funds). The platform announced a new transaction record in the first half of 2019,
completing 36 private company-led transactions at a $2.3 billion transaction value. Nasdaq
Private Market Sets New Transaction Record in the First Half of 2019, GLOBENEWSWIRE
(July 23, 2019, 10:05 ET), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/07/23/18865
33/0/en/Nasdaq-Private-Market-Sets-New-Transaction-Record-in-the-First-Half-of-2019.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/B5PW-E6CV].
241. See FORGE, https://forgeglobal.com [https://perma.cc/F8UQ-Z342] (last visited Nov.
16, 2020) (claiming $3.2 billion in recorded transaction volume since inception).
242. See EQUITYZEN, https://equityzen.com [https://perma.cc/D9TR-PW4Y] (last visited
Nov. 16, 2020) (calling itself the “marketplace for pre-IPO equity”).
243. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2013). Note that the JOBS Act changes also included
removal of the restrictions on general solicitation and advertising in the context of Rule 144A
resales.
244. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1) (2013) (describing qualified institutional buyers).
245. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771
(July 24, 2013) (allowing securities to be offered to persons other than qualified institutional
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makes the markets for privately placed securities more liquid.246 Overall,
Accredited Investors, including QIBs, can purchase and resell unicorn and
other private company securities more easily than ever.247 Under these rules,
for many participants, private markets offer liquidity that once required
public offerings.
g.

Unicorns May Have Up to 2000 Shareholders

Even for private companies with many shareholders, the need to go
public due to dispersed ownership of the companies’ securities has been
reduced.248 The JOBS Act also amended Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act
to increase the number of shareholders that triggers registration: private
companies can have up to 2000 shareholders, including up to 500 nonAccredited Investors.249 The previous (500 total shareholder) threshold250 is
reportedly what drove former unicorns Google and Facebook to make
IPOs.251 That threshold is reached much later now, if at all. Some estimated
buyers).
246. See Dan Caplinger, How Rule 144A Created a Shadow Financial Market, NASDAQ
(July 3, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/how-rule-144a-created-shadow-f
inancial-market-2015-07-03 [https://perma.cc/Z34D-AMQ2] (“Rule 144A has made the
markets for privately placed restricted securities more liquid than they would otherwise be”
by allowing shorter-term investment in securities.). Resales of Rule 144A securities are
eligible for Depository Trust Company clearance and settlement, with issuers and participants
responsible for determining that the securities laws are observed. See Order Approving a
Proposed Rule Change Relating to Eliminating the SRO Requirement as a Condition of DTCEligibility for Securities that are Eligible for Resale Under Rule 144A Under the Securities
Act of 1933, Exchange Act Release No. 59384, 74 Fed. Reg. 7941 (Feb. 20, 2009).
247. But see Publication or Submission of Quotations Without Specified Information,
Exchange Act Release No. 87115, 84 Fed. Reg. 58206 (proposed Oct. 30, 2019) (proposing
an increase in the requirements for information provided to investors).
248. See Michael J. Zeidel, The JOBS Act: Did It Accomplish Its Goals? HARV. L. SCH. F.
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jul. 18, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/18/the-jobs-ac
t-did-it-accomplish-its-goals/ [https://perma.cc/68UR-Q3HC] (characterizing this as
“providing [private] companies with more flexibility in timing their IPOs” as a result of the
number of shareholders).
249. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2016).
250. See Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179,
192 (2012).
251. Dan Primack, Killing the 500-Shareholder Rule, FORTUNE (Nov. 8, 2011), https://for
tune.com/2011/11/08/killing-the-500-shareholder-rule/
[https://perma.cc/3UZM-Z4MJ]
(discussing introduction of legislation to raise the limit); Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman,
House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to the Hon. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://www.knowledgemosaic.com/reso
urcecenter/Issa.041211.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D4P-SK64] (arguing for the raised threshold).
The JOBS Act was passed soon after Facebook’s IPO, and many scholars feel that Mark
Zuckerberg’s complaints contributed directly to the raised threshold. de Fontenay, supra note
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that when the JOBS Act was passed, more than two-thirds of public
companies were beneath the 2000 shareholder cap.252
h.

Cumulative Result

The cumulative result of these regulatory and market developments is
a dramatic increase in more passive investment in large private startups.
Deregulatory measures have relieved pressure on unicorns to pursue an
IPO.253 Consequently, long-term and often large-scale private companies
have no need to establish the governance mechanisms or provide the investor
protection through information that securities law requires of public
companies.254 Companies can remain in “stealth mode”255 long after they
achieve a size and scope that may pose a threat to an increasingly large
number of investors.
III.

MANY STAKEHOLDERS ARE HARMED

A. Corporations Serve the Interests of Stakeholders Other Than
Shareholders
It is not only investors who may be harmed by unicorns with poor
corporate governance. All corporations, including unicorns, serve the
interests of a variety of stakeholders. Given their size and, therefore, their
potential impact, unicorns need accountable corporate governance to protect
the array of persons, both legal and natural, connected to them. They are big
enough to generate substantial negative externalities in the event of a
meltdown and are operating in largely unregulated spaces that enable them
to bypass most of our legal mechanisms to ensure good governance.

173, at 460.
252. John Coates & Robert Pozen, Bill to Help Businesses Raise Capital Goes Too Far,
WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bill-to-help-busines
ses-raise-capital-goes-too-far/2012/03/13/gIQAVWgFCS_story.html [https://perma.cc/DUT
8-P5JZ] (arguing against the change).
253. Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 190, at 1153 (discussing ways in which the JOBS Act would
enable companies to remain private).
254. See Jones, supra note 57, at 179–182 (noting that unicorn investors may not receive
the kind of information they would get from a public company, and that “[b]ecause unicorns
are free from public disclosure requirements, they can engage in questionable activities with
less fear of exposure”).
255. Matt Villano, Why Startups Launch in ‘Stealth Mode’ and Others Don’t,
ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/229461 [https://perma.
cc/29X9-WCTD] (explaining the pros and cons of the practice).
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Unicorns provide extreme examples of the need for stakeholder (not just
shareholder or investor) protection.
For many decades, depending on whether one measures from the 1919
Dodge v. Ford decision requiring Henry Ford pay a special dividend to the
company shareholders,256 or from economist Milton Friedman’s writing in
the 1960s and 70s,257 shareholder primacy has been a dominant way to
understand corporate decision-making and governance. In this view, the
corporation is to be run primarily for the benefit of the stockholders – the
owners of the business.258 As Friedman expressed it: “there is one and only
one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules
of the game . . . .”259 Other incidental benefits are permissible,260 but the
fundamental objective and basis for corporate decision-making is clear. As
the Business Roundtable put it in its 1997 statement on corporate
governance: “[t]he paramount duty of management and of boards of directors
is to the corporation’s stockholders; the interests of other stakeholders are
relevant as a derivative of the duty to stockholders.”261 This understanding
was dominant for so long, in fact, that in 2000, Professors Reiner Kraakman
and Henry Hansmann argued for the “end of history” for corporate law.262
Kraakman and Hansmann asserted that “[t]here is no longer any serious
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase
long-term shareholder value.”263
There have always been other views. Corporations began as
instrumentalities of the state264 and require state government action to come
256. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919) (holding that a “business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders”).
257. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970),
available at http://umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2SV-X9ET].
258. See John H. Matheson & Vilena Nicolet, Shareholder Democracy and Special
Interest Governance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1649, 1653 (2019) (noting that the “traditional
shareholder primacy model of a corporation derives from the concept that the shareholders
are the owners of the corporation”).
259. FRIEDMAN, supra note 257, at 112.
260. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A. 2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(holding that the board can consider the interests of other constituencies only if there are
rationally related benefits accruing to the shareholders).
261. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (Sept.
1997), available at http://www.ralphgomory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Business-Ro
undtable-1997.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN2K-NLS9].
262. Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2000).
263. Id.
264. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (holding that the
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into existence.265 Moreover, corporations are important actors in society,
fulfilling a multitude of social roles. In the 1930s, two prominent corporate
law experts, Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd debated corporate purpose in
the Harvard Law Review. Professor Berle took the side of shareholder
primacy,266 and Professor Dodd argued that a corporation’s purpose is
broader and includes benefits for employees, consumers, and society itself.267
At present, such broader views of the corporation’s responsibility are
gaining strength. And these broader views are particularly persuasive in the
unicorn context.
B. Contemporary Debate Regarding Stakeholders
1.

Emphasis on Stakeholders

An exclusive focus on the well-being of shareholders hardly captures
the impact that our largest companies, regardless of whether their capital
structure is public or private, have on the world. Profits (and executive
salaries) are skyrocketing, along with income and wealth inequality.268
Environmental and social concerns of various types are mounting, and the
varied obligations of business corporations are increasingly recognized.269 In
Contract Clause prohibits states from violating contracts with private or public corporations).
265. To form a corporation, the incorporations file articles of incorporation (also known
as a certificate of incorporation) with the secretary of state in the state of incorporation. Those
documents must be accepted by the state, and the corporation must remain in compliance with
state statutes and regulations in order to continue in existence. See David M. Steingold, Steps
in Articles of Incorporation, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/articles-incor
poration.html [https://perma.cc/4J56-5VM8] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020) (discussing the
general requirements of articles of incorporation).
266. Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(1931) (arguing management powers should be exercised for the “ratable benefit of all the
shareholders.”).
267. E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom Are Our Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (arguing that corporations should have “a social service as well as
a profit-making function . . .”).
268. See Michael Batty et al., Introducing the Distributional Financial Accounts of the
United States, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS, 26 (2019), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019
017pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3WE-DPFF] (pointing out that persons in the top 10% of the
wealth distribution in the United States hold a large and growing share of U.S. wealth, while
the bottom half hold substantially less).
269. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012); see also Todd H.
Baker, Shareholder Primacy Isn’t the Best of All Possible Worlds, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct.
23, 2019), available at https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/10/23/shareholder-primacy
-isnt-the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/ [https://perma.cc/BY2Y-2CFR] (suggesting that
shareholder primacy contributed to the rapid growth of income and wealth inequality in the
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2019, as the WeWork IPO unraveled and the Uber and Lyft IPOs
disappointed,270 significant players in the corporate world were talking, once
again, about the appropriate roles of the business firm.
In his 2018 letter to the chief executives of major corporations, Larry
Fink, CEO of Blackrock, stated, “Society is demanding that companies, both
public and private, serve a social purpose.”271 Martin Lipton, one of the
founders of a preeminent New York corporate law firm, described a “New
Paradigm.”272 Lipton argued that shareholder profit is a byproduct of a wellfunctioning corporate governance regime, not its sole objective, and that
governments charter corporations to promote the economy and increase
opportunity for society at large, not just to make money for shareholders.273
In August 2019, the Business Roundtable revised its 1997 statement of
the purpose of the corporation.274 The new statement did not mention
shareholders until over 80% of the way through,275 and then only in the
context of “long-term”276 value and a commitment to transparency and
effective engagement. The statement, signed by 181 CEOs, focused on

United States); Andrew Ross Sorkin, How Shareholder Democracy Failed the People, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK, (Aug. 20, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/business/dealbook
/business-roundtable-corporate-responsibility.html [https://perma.cc/PXH4-9RGR] (arguing
that the adoption of Friedman’s shareholder primacy argument brought with it increased
layoffs, decreased research and development budgets, and the substitution of 401(k)s for
pension programs).
270. Maureen Farrell, 2019: The Year of IPO Disappointment, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/2019-the-year-of-ipo-disappointment-11577615400 [htt
ps://perma.cc/4RXG-J597] (noting investor “wariness” of the Uber and Lyft IPOs).
271. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOS A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK
(2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter [h
ttps://perma.cc/6ZCJ-YLGU].
272. Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adoptthe-new-paradigm/ (based on his 2017 memorandum, Corporate Governance: The New
Paradigm, available through the University of Pennsylvania Delaware Corporation Law
Research Center, available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7876-culled-martin-lipto
n-publicationspdf [https://perma.cc/94D9-P5EG] (last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
273. Id.
274. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION
(August 2019) https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpo
se-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/J4Z
Z-DNEV].
275. Alan Murray, America’s CEOs Seek a New Purpose for the Corporation, FORTUNE
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://fortune.com/longform/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations-purpo
se/ [https://perma.cc/9NVE-U2AR] (describing the organization’s change from its previous
statement of corporate purpose)
276. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 274.
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customers, employees, suppliers, and communities.277
In October 2019, then-Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo
Strine released Towards a Fair and Sustainable Capitalism.278 In it, Justice
Strine argued that “[t]he incentive system for the governance of American
corporations has failed in recent decades to adequately encourage long-term
investment, sustainable business practices, and most importantly, fair
gainsharing between shareholders and workers.”279 Justice Strine suggested
ways to reform corporate governance in order to make corporations give
more thoughtful consideration to their employees and social responsibility.280
Some unicorns have embraced this perspective. Airbnb announced in
January 2020 that it would tie bonuses to the firm’s performance on social
goals.281 Airbnb also announced a stakeholder committee on its board of
directors and promised to hold a “stakeholder day” to report on its
progress.282 Others promote things like employee experience and bettering
the global community.283
2.

Objections to Stakeholder Emphasis

Unsurprisingly, insistence on the importance of stakeholders to
corporate decision making has met with substantial skepticism and
influential objections. Warren Buffett argued, “This is the shareholders’
money,” and corporate managers should not make company decisions based
on their social beliefs.284 Professor Jesse Fried predicted that the Business
277. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 274.
278. Leo E. Strine, Jr, Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism (U. Penn. Inst. for Law &
Econ. Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019), available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/
files/Fair%20and%20Sustainable%20Capitalism%20Proposal%20-%20White%20Paper_09
.26.19%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TUV-G53D].
279. Id. at 1.
280. Id. at 3–22.
281. John D. Stoll, Airbnb’s New Compensation Plan Asks Shareholders to Share with
Other Stakeholders, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnbs-newcompensation-plan-asks-shareholders-to-share-with-other-stakeholders-11579358335
(describing the debate as having reached “peak handwringing” with the Business Roundtable
letter).
282. See Id. (noting recent challenges faced by Airbnb with respect to policing its
platform).
283. For example, now-defunct Better Place, Inc. sought to reduce global dependency on
petroleum. Better Place, Inc. BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/32
79529Z:US [https://perma.cc/RVN5-DSTS] (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
284. Robert Armstrong, Warren Buffett on Why Companies Cannot Be Moral Arbiters,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/ebbc9b46-1754-11ea-9ee4-11f26041
5385 [https://perma.cc/QRP2-GDEU] (reporting Buffett’s opinion that the government
should promote select projects, not companies).
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Roundtable pledge will not affect how the signers run their companies and
described that as a “[g]ood thing,” because shareholder primacy keeps
corporate managers accountable and enables efficient capital flows in the
economy.285 The media was quick to point out that, less than a month after
Jeff Bezos signed the Business Roundtable letter, Amazon subsidiary Whole
Foods cut medical benefits for hundreds of part-time workers.286
Commentators have suggested that the choices that need to be made among
various stakeholder groups result in even more power for the board.287
Still, the debate itself may indicate a wider appreciation of the persons
affected by corporate operations, regardless of whether they are public or
private.
C. Poor Unicorn Governance Endangers a Large Number of
Stakeholders
Corporate governance failure directly impacts more than founders and
their large investors. Corporate governance failure in a large company,
regardless of its reporting status, creates broad harms.288 And when the entity
is a private company, the harm is particularly unforeseeable for the
stakeholders who have little information and limited remedies.289

285. Jesse Fried, Shareholders Always Come First and That’s a Good Thing, FIN. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fff170a0-e5e0-11e9-b8e0-026e07cbe5b4 [https://
perma.cc/QM9V-6K3H] (arguing that payouts from public companies to shareholders are
then invested in new companies, for example by private equity and venture capital outfits).
286. See Matt Levine, We Is Sorry About the Weirdness, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Sept. 13,
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-13/we-is-sorry-about-the-weir
dness [https://perma.cc/XP4T-AVYP] (discussing “stakeholder capitalism”); Hayley
Peterson, Whole Foods Is Cutting Medical Benefits for Hundreds of Part-time Workers, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/whole-foods-cuts-medical-benefi
ts-for-part-time-workers-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/2JYL-TWKR] (noting that the change
impacted less than 2% of the company’s workforce, some of whom had worked there for
many years).
287. See Matt Levine, Tidjane Thiam Gets Some Time to Garden, BLOOMBERG OPINION
(Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-02-07/tidjane-thiam-getssome-time-to-garden [https://perma.cc/5QE6-N9YR] (discussing stakeholder capitalism and
using the contentious ouster of Credit Suisse Group AG CEO Tidjane Thiam as an example);
see also Matthew Levine, Bank Isn’t Happy with Its Owner, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Jan. 21,
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-21/bank-isn-t-happy-with-its-o
wner [https://perma.cc/3NS4-MCJM] (discussing who controls a company and observing that
“[s]takeholders have more ways to disagree than shareholders do”).
288. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Reflections: The Public Governance Duty, 50 GA. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2015) (pointing out that corporate risk-taking can impact the public as well as
investors, particularly in large, “systemically important” firms).
289. See supra Part II.B (discussing the lack of public disclosure regarding unicorns).
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A troubled company at a unicorn scale may subject employees to
substandard working conditions, or sudden unemployment. When a unicorn
stumbles, it may jeopardize the viability of related companies and rattle
markets. And, in some sectors, a poorly governed unicorn may even put
individuals’ health at risk.
1.

Employees

Unicorns employ thousands of people. In February 2020, Airbnb
reported approximately 7,500 employees,290 Doordash approximately
7500,291 and SpaceX over 6000.292 A poorly governed unicorn may subject
those employees to discrimination, harassment, and an overall “toxic
corporate culture” in the workplace.293 In a 2017 survey, almost half of
women working in startups reported being sexually harassed, and almost
three-quarters reported experiencing gender-based discrimination.294 In
2017, Susan Fowler publicized the sexist culture and harassment at Uber,
discussing specific instances in a now-famous blog post.295 The eventual
result was the firing of twenty employees296 and the ouster of Travis Kalanick
as CEO.297 WeWork is currently defending a pregnancy discrimination
290. Airbnb’s Competitors, Revenue, Number of Employees, Funding and Acquisitions,
OWLER https://www.owler.com/company/airbnb [https://perma.cc/RN3G-C926] (last visited
Nov. 21, 2020).
291. Doordash’s Competitors, Revenue, Number of Employees, Funding and Acquisitions,
OWLER, https://www.owler.com/company/doordash [https://perma.cc/85MX-79ZA] (last
visited Nov. 21, 2020).
292. About, SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/about [https://perma.cc/N3SD-9GND]
(last visited Nov. 21, 2020).
293. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Uber to Pay $4.4 Million to
Resolve EEOC Sexual Harassment and Retaliation Charge (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.eeo
c.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-18-19.cfm [https://perma.cc/4HPJ-T7G7]; see also Jones,
supra note 57, at 180 (noting the toxic corporate cultures of both Uber and Theranos).
294. Megan Rose Dickey, Boardlist Founder Says Sexual Discrimination Is More
Prevalent than People Think, TECHCRUNCH (Jan, 28, 2017, 1:49 PM) https://techcrunch.com
/2017/01/28/boardlist-founder-says-sexual-discrimination-is-more-prevalent-than-people-thi
nk/ [https://perma.cc/T95C-W8KL].
295. Susan Fowler, Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year at Uber, SUSAN FOWLER
(Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-one-very-stran
ge-year-at-uber [https://perma.cc/RH92-T5WM].
296. Sarah Buhr, Uber Has Fired More than 20 People over Harassment Probe,
TECHCRUNCH (June 6, 2017, 1:51 PM) https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/06/uber-may-have-fir
ed-more-than-20-people-over-sexual-harrasment-probe/ [https://perma.cc/NQ7E-9VKN].
297. See Zoe Kleinman, Uber: The scandals that drove Travis Kalanick out, BBC (Jun.
21, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40352868 [https://perma.cc/4NTB-MBZ
Q] (chronicling scandals relating to sexual harassment, macho culture, and the departure of
senior executives that led to Kalanick’s resignation).
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lawsuit filed by Neumann’s former chief of staff on behalf of herself and
other women at that company.298
In addition, many start-up employees are compensated partially in the
form of company stock options. Private company stock options are illiquid299
and function as a de facto noncompete until the company goes public.300
Unicorn employees compensated with stock options tend to be both
unprotected and uninformed regarding, for example, senior rights of
managers and other investors.301
This was even more pronounced in the case of WeWork, because
Softbank’s October 2019 bailout was originally supposed to include not just
$6.5 billion to the company, but also a $3 billion tender offer.302 Those funds
were supposed to extract Neumann, as well as certain institutional investors,
who would receive at least some return on their investment and flee.303 When
SoftBank backed out of the share purchase arrangement,304 litigation
ensued.305
298. Class and Collective Administrative Charge of Discrimination, Retaliation, and
Gender Pay Disparity, Bardhi v. The We Co., supra note 5.
299. See Anat Alon-Beck, Unicorn Stock Options – Golden Goose or Trojan Horse?, 2019
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 107, 108 (2019) (noting that the extended private status of unicorns
delays liquidity for employees paid in options).
300. See Seth Oranburg, Democratizing Startups, 68 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2016)
(noting problems with the JOBS Act and proposing a new rule to permit transparent, webbased venture exchanges).
301. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold? Equity Compensation & the Mature Startup,
11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 613, 614–16 (2017) (arguing that although startup employees may be
relatively capable investors in a company’s early stages, they are poorly equipped to navigate
the risks of a unicorn).
302. Taylor Telford, WeWork Snags $9.5 Billion Bailout from SoftBank, Staving Off
Bankruptcy, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2019, 8:27 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busin
ess/2019/10/23/wework-snags-billion-bailout-softbank-staving-off-bankruptcy/ [https://per
ma.cc/6MFA-AXVP] (noting that WeWork would have run out of money within weeks
without the cash infusion).
303. Theron Mohamed, SoftBank’s $9.5 Billion Bailout of WeWork Hits a Hurdle as
Japanese Banks Are Worried about Funding It, MARKETS INSIDER (Dec. 23, 2019, 6:09 AM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/softbank-wework-rescue-deal-hits-hurdlejapanese-bank-talks-stall-2019-12-1028781774 [https://perma.cc/F6PM-EFNA].
304. Noah Kirsch, Softbank’s Latest Lifeline to WeWork Is a Fresh Snub of Adam
Neumann, But What Happens Next?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/noahkirsch/2020/08/15/softbanks-latest-lifeline-to-wework-is-a-fresh-snub-of-ada
m-neumann-but-what-happens-next/#8f85a7820038
[https://perma.cc/8CAR-NXSA]
(explaining Softbank’s new investment in the company, and Softbank’s decision to back out
of the purchase agreement based on WeWork’s failure to meet the required conditions).
305. Neumann v. SoftBank Group Corp, No. 2020-0329, (Del. Ch. filed May 4, 2020)
(seeking damages for SoftBank’s decision not to proceed with the share purchase); The We
Company v. SoftBank Group Corp, No. 2020-0258, (Del. Ch. filed Apr. 7, 2020) (seeking
specific performance of the $3 billion share purchase agreement). This litigation is ongoing,
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Most employees, however, would have been unable to take advantage
of the tender offer anyway. Over 90% of employees holding options were
underwater, meaning that the SoftBank share price being offered was below
the grant price for the employees’ awards or options.306 For such employees,
those options, a large part of their compensation, are not and may never be
worth anything.307
In some cases, the lack of corporate governance can lead to sudden
contraction or even closure of the unicorn. Theranos closed its operations.308
When WeWork lost 85% of its valuation309 and refocused and reorganized
its operations, the company fired 2,400 employees, and transferred another
1,000 to an outside vendor.310 WeWork’s losses and layoffs continued as
the Covid-19 pandemic struck.311 Airbnb laid off 25% of its workforce in
and in August 2020, the Delaware Chancery Court released a preliminary opinion regarding
different directors’ rights to review information and control decisions relating to the lawsuits.
In re WeWork Litig., 2020 BL 319261, 2020 Del. Ch. Lexis 270, (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2020)
(holding that members of a special board committee that was established before the SoftBank
decision not to proceed with the tender offer are still entitled to discovery of company attorney
communications related to the dispute). In October 2020, the Court rejected some breach of
fiduciary duty claims made by Neumann against SoftBank and an affiliated venture fund. In
re WeWork Litig., No. 2020-0258-AGB, 2020 WL 6375438, Mem. Op. at 3 (Del. Ch. Oct.
30, 2020) (holding that those claims duplicated other contractual claims that are being made
in the consolidated action).
306. Eliot Brown, WeWork Employee Options Underwater as Ex-CEO Reaps, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 23, 2019, 6:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-employees-feel-sting-asex-ceo-stands-to-reap-11571870011 [https://perma.cc/YK7Y-DR79] (describing company
employees as not doing as well as Neumann).
307. Sarah E. Needleman & Eliot Brown, WeWork to Cut Around 17% of Workforce,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2019, 2:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-to-cut-around17-of-workforce-11574355656 [https://perma.cc/K2WV-NDJQ].
308. Reed Abelson, Theranos Is Shutting Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/health/theranos-shutting-down.html [https://perma.cc/454G-ZEH
P] (reporting that the company would shutter its operations). Any equity investments in the
company became worthless. John Carreyrou, Blood-Testing Firm Theranos to Dissolve,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2018, 12:10 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blood-testing-firm-the
ranos-to-dissolve-1536115130 [https://perma.cc/VZX6-Y27E].
309. Maureen Farrell et al., The Fall of WeWork: How a Startup Darling Came Unglued,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2019 4:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fall-of-wework-howa-startup-darling-came-unglued-11571946003 [https://perma.cc/F622-6W2R] (explaining
that the WeWork valuation went from $47 billion in January 2019 to less than $8 billion in
October 2019).
310. Gillian Tan, WeWork Says It’s Cutting 2,400 Jobs Globally, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21,
2019 3:40 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-21/wework-says-it-s-cut
ting-2-400-jobs-globally-to-reach-efficiency [https://perma.cc/BKT8-FKA7]; Needleman &
Brown, supra note 307.
311. Samantha Sharf, WeWork Unraveling Continues with New Layoff Round, FORBES
(Apr. 30, 2020, 7:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2020/04/30/weworkunraveling-continues-with-new-layoff-round/#4ee1ac363581 [https://perma.cc/3PGJ-RD9T]
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May 2020, as its pandemic-related losses began to be felt.312
2.

Customers or Clients (or Patients)

A poorly governed unicorn may lack the compliance structures needed
to ensure that it is licensed to operate313—or is medically safe.314 The risk
seems particularly acute given the “growth-at-any-cost”315 mindset of many
startups.316 This risk is illustrated in the case of Theranos. Thanks to overgenerous capitalization and underwhelming governance, Theranos achieved
a peak valuation of $9 billion and raised over $700 million317 while refusing
to disclose the details of its blood-testing technology, which did not perform
as claimed.318 Dominated by its charismatic founder, Elizabeth Holmes, the
“blood unicorn” barreled forward with falsified results despite employee
complaints and physician concerns.319 Eventually, the company had to void
tens of thousands of test results that had been issued to patients and
physicians.320
Better Place Inc., a California-based unicorn that sold electric cars and
built charging station networks under founder Shai Aggasi’s hubristic
(quoting a company spokesperson who called it “realigning”).
312. PYMTS, Airbnb Suffers Record Losses in Q2, IPO Still Planned, PYMTS.COM (Aug.
13, 2020), https://www.pymnts.com/earnings/2020/airbnb-suffers-record-losses-in-q2-ipo-st
ill-planned/ [https://perma.cc/46N2-LRM8] (reporting that 25% of Airbnb’s 1900-person
workforce were being laid off).
313. This was a problem at Uber. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory
Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 385–87 (2017) (“Uber and many other businesses
are built around and based upon a plan to change the law—and, in some instances, to simply
break the law in the meantime.”).
314. As discussed above, Theranos marketed a non-functioning blood testing service.
315. Jeremy G. Philips, The Rise and Fall of the Unicorn, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), htt
ps://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/business/dealbook/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-unicorn.html
[https://perma.cc/Y3TK-GSX4].
316. How Unicorns Grow, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2016, at 28, 28-30 (discussing the
rapid growth of unicorn companies and how it is happening).
317. Matt Levine, The Blood Unicorn Theranos Was Just a Fairy Tale, BLOOMBERG
OPINION (Mar. 14, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-03-14
/theranos-misled-investors-and-consumers-who-used-its-blood-test [https://perma.cc/E28SM8UN].
318. John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled with Its Blood-Testing
Technology, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-h
as-struggled-with-blood-tests-1444881901 [https://perma.cc/J97Z-D727] (detailing Theranos
falsifications and complaints against it).
319. Id.
320. John Carreyrou, Theranos Voids Two Years of Edison Blood-Test Results, WALL ST.
J. (May 18, 2016, 8:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-voids-two-years-of-edis
on-blood-test-results-1463616976 [https://perma.cc/647Z-4AUC].
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leadership, left all of its Israeli car owners without the necessary charging
and battery swap infrastructure when the company went bankrupt in 2013.321
Stories of gross exaggeration, if not lies, about the company’s technology,
runaway expenses, cronyism, so-called “Shai math,”322 and lack of board
oversight abounded.323
3.

Collateral Businesses

Many unicorns operate related businesses, which may also go under due
to governance issues at the unicorn itself. In fall 2019, WeWork sought to
cut costs and unload assets quickly. The sudden shuttering of WeWork’s
unrelated collateral ventures imposed substantial hardships on a variety of
stakeholders.324 Over 100 children were impacted by WeWork’s abrupt
decision to close its WeGrow school.325 Meetup, an event-facilitating
company that WeWork bought for $200 million in 2017, laid off as much as
321. Max Chafkin, A Broken Place: The Spectacular Failure Of The Startup That Was
Going To Change The World, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com
/3028159/a-broken-place-better-place [https://perma.cc/6FFC-5PRV].
322. Id.
323. Id; see also BRIAN BLUM, TOTALED: THE BILLION-DOLLAR CRASH OF THE STARTUP
THAT TOOK ON BIG AUTO, BIG OIL AND THE WORLD 177–233 (2017) (chronicling
mismanagement, overpromising, and lack of trust in the company in chapters such as “Bait
and Switch,” “How to Lose Everything without Really Trying,” and “Who Trusts Shai?”).
324. Needleman & Brown, supra note 307 (noting the 1,000 employees of companies
WeWork had acquired and was trying to sell).
325. Meghan Morris & Becky Peterson, WeWork’s school is closing at the end of the
academic year as the company ditches passion projects to stem its huge losses, BUS. INSIDER
(Oct. 11, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/wework-closes-wegrow-rebek
ah-neumanns-school-effort-2019-10 [https://perma.cc/5A2B-XATW]; see also Blake
Montgomery, WeWork’s Ritzy Private School Has ‘Stranded’ Parents as CEO Walks Away
With Nearly $2 Billion, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 23, 2019, 5:14 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.
com/weworks-private-school-wegrow-has-stranded-parents-as-adam-neumann-cashes-out [h
ttps://perma.cc/M69P-7ZAA] (quoting an educational consultant as saying, “[t]he kids will
be the collateral damage when the school closes”). WeGrow closed in late 2019. However,
Rebekah Neumann bought back the curriculum and some furnishings of the WeGrow school
and is attempting to reopen the program. David Jeans, Rebekah Neumann Buys Back
WeGrow, WeWork’s Defunct $42,000-A-Year School, With Plans To Relaunch, FORBES (Jun.
30, 2020, 3:49 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidjeans/2020/06/30/rebekah-neumannbuys-back-wegrow-weworks/#312f42b92376 [https://perma.cc/82JZ-MNZY]. Ironically,
following the fall 2019 WeGrow program closure, WeWork CEO Sandeep Mathrani
coordinated with New York City schools to use WeWork locations in response to Covid-19
to hold in-person classes while reducing the density among students. Kevin Stankiewicz,
WeWork is talking to NYC private schools about holding classes in offices this fall, CEO says,
CNBC REAL ESTATE (Jun. 16, 2020, 10:14 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/16/weworktalking-to-nyc-private-schools-about-holding-classes-in-offices.html [https://perma.cc/Q4Q
V-VJM9].
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25% of its workforce in the wake of WeWork’s cancellation of its IPO.326
WeWork’s woes led to layoffs of thousands of staff members at Managed by
Q, an office management platform purchased by WeWork for $220 million
in April 2019327 (and which it sold in January 2020 for less than a quarter of
the price).328 In December 2019, WeWork shut down Spacious, a restaurant
coworking start-up that WeWork had acquired four months earlier, laying
off its entire fifty-person staff and disrupting the company’s customers’
businesses.329
4.

Economy and Markets

Economic ripples from unicorn stumbles may also be widespread. By
2019, WeWork was the largest commercial tenant in New York City, and
only the British government controlled more space in London.330 While still
private, Uber had a significant impact on the transportation behavior of
below-median-income consumers who may have lower rates of automobile
ownership.331 In 2017, Airbnb represented a significant percentage of the
hotel room supply in several major cities332 and had a significant effect on
326. Kate Clark, WeWork-owned Meetup confirms restructuring, layoffs, TECHCRUNCH
(Nov. 4, 2019, 6:18 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/04/wework-owned-meetup-confir
ms-restructuring-layoffs/ [https://perma.cc/TLM5-8V7M].
327. TRD Staff, WeWork plans to sell Managed by Q at a major loss, THEREALDEAL (Dec.
19, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://therealdeal.com/2019/12/19/wework-plans-to-sell-managed-byq-at-major-loss/ [https://perma.cc/U8UP-Z4TP].
328. Daria Rud, WeWork Sells Managed by Q Unit at an Incredibly Low Price,
COINSPEAKER (Jan. 23, 2020, 1:09 PM), https://www.coinspeaker.com/wework-sells-manage
d-by-q-unit/ [https://perma.cc/5ZVT-VF8D].
329. Shirin Ghaffary, WeWork is Shutting Down a Restaurant Coworking Startup
Acquired Only 4 Months Ago, VOX (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/1
2/21012723/wework-spacious-shutting-down-adam-neumann-coworking
[https://perma.cc/JJW6-BE7W].
330. See Jack Sidders & Natalie Wong, WeWork Landlords in London and New York Are
Bracing for a Market Fallout, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/ne
ws/articles/2019-09-27/wework-landlords-in-london-new-york-bracing-for-market-fallout [h
ttps://perma.cc/NS73-QAEQ] (discussing the concern of Landlords as WeWork’s demand
begins to fall); Platt & Edgecliffe-Johnson, supra note 13, (discussing widespread effects of
WeWork’s financial collapse); see also Peter Eavis, ‘It’s Definitely Pretty Empty’: Why
Saving WeWork Will Be Hard, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/1
0/24/business/wework-growth.html [https://perma.cc/9Z3N-ED3M] (pointing out that not
only was WeWork New York’s largest private tenant, it had also committed to take on an
additional 2.6 million square feet in 2019).
331. Fan, supra note 63, at 600.
332. See Avery Hartmans, Airbnb Now Has More Listings Worldwide than the Top Five
Hotel Brands Combined, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/ai
rbnb-total-worldwide-listings-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/9DUB-DEJT] (noting 4 million
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local economies.333
None of the foregoing arguments made for a company’s responsibility
to stakeholders depends on the distinction between public and private
corporations. While a firm’s capital structure presumably gives rise to
obligations to the provider of capital, as a general matter, a firm may be
obliged to stakeholders whether or not its capital structure means it is classed
as “public” or “private.”
That said, as unicorns proliferate, they may even jeopardize the capacity
of markets to function as mechanisms for public choice. Professor De
Fontenay observes that the ability of so many large private companies to
avoid mandatory disclosure constitutes “free riding” on the information
disclosed by public companies.334 The securities laws’ mandatory disclosure
requirements produce price and other valuation information that is important
to the functioning of the economy. Unicorns’ large-scale opt out from that
structure shrinks the pool of disclosing companies and threatens the quality
and usefulness of the information available to the financial markets.
In sum, an enterprise large enough to be a unicorn has widespread and
profound economic and social effects.335 Shoddy governance in such a firm,
harms more than just the profit-seeking diversified investors often idealized
by corporate finance.

listings worldwide in 2017).
333. Fan, supra note 63, at 600. The potential impact of an Airbnb failure became clear
with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. See Kristen Grind et al., Airbnb’s Coronavirus
Crisis: Burning Cash, Angry Hosts and an Uncertain Future, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2020), ht
tps://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnbs-coronavirus-crisis-burning-cash-angry-hosts-and-an-unc
ertain-future-11586365860 [https://perma.cc/RUE7-JEJZ] (cataloging the losses suffered by
hosts and travelers). Nevertheless, Airbnb announced in August 2020 that it had submitted a
confidential draft registration statement to the SEC. Press Release, Airbnb, Airbnb
Announces Confidential Submission of Draft Registration Statement (Aug. 19, 2020), https:/
/news.airbnb.com/airbnb-announces-confidential-submission-of-draft-registration-statement
/ [https://perma.cc/XJ6B-98B9].
334. See de Fontenay, supra note 173, at 451 (calling the current structure “inherently
unstable”).
335. See Fan, supra note 63, at 602 (pointing out that unicorns may, for example spur
economic development because their “sheer size and demand for the services they provide
create a need for infrastructure and services that assist these companies, influencing the
growth of businesses in other industries.”). In fact, there is a growing market niche in
providing infrastructure and services to the unicorns themselves. See Pickaxes and Shovels:
35 Startups Providing Infrastructure for the On-Demand Boom, CB INSIGHTS (Jul. 14, 2015),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/infrastructure-for-on-demand-startups/ [https://perma.cc/L
96T-DCGN] (describing companies specializing in route and vehicle optimization, as well as
background checks and security).
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COUNTERARGUMENT: BAD GOVERNANCE IS A FAIR PRICE FOR
INNOVATION

It might be argued that more rigorous governance of unicorns could
stifle innovation and prevent visionary founders from developing new
disruptive technologies and business models.336 Startups are special, one
might say, and often dramatically change or even create new sectors of the
economy. A more rigid conception of how a company is to run, with
conventional requirements regarding governance and financial performance,
could prevent change. Therefore, such an argument would conclude, startups need to retain their freedom.337
Some commentators argue that risky endeavors are often a life work for
the founders of a start-up.338 All their eggs are in one basket, and the payoff
is contingent on their first-mover advantage.
The disclosure and
transparency that result from reporting company status would allow copycat
competitors to steal that advantage. “Stealth mode” is necessary to develop
revolutionary new products.339 Without first mover advantages, the
motivation for founders to risk everything would be substantially reduced,
and innovation would suffer accordingly.340
336. Companies often argue that their founders’ ideas and innovations are integral to the
company’s success, even when the escapades of those founders create problems, if not
liabilities. See, e.g., Nikola Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10Q), at 55 (Aug. 4, 2020)
(asserting that its founder and CEO, Travis Milton, “is the source of many, if not most, of the
ideas and execution driving Nikola,” and that if the company lost Milton it would be
“significantly disadvantaged”). This perception of Milton’s essential vision was challenged
by the problems posed by his behavior less than a month later. See, e.g., Ben Foldy & William
Boston, Nikola Founder Trevor Milton Resigns as Executive Chairman amid Fraud
Allegations, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2020) (discussing Milton’s removal from the company
and allegations that Milton misrepresented the capabilities of the company technology).
337. See, e.g., Justin Fox, Elon Musk’s Brain Isn’t Like Yours, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Sept.
10, 2018), https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/elon-musk-s-quirks-are-worth-the-trou
ble-for-tesla [https://perma.cc/GFW2-VK9A] (reviewing Melissa Schilling’s book Quirky
which suggests, for example, that Elon Musk’s outrageous behavior is related to his extreme
creativity).
338. See Karen Firestone, How Hard Do Company Founders Really Work?, HARVARD
BUS. REV. (Dec. 17, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/12/how-hard-do-company-founders-really-w
ork [https://perma.cc/W3YM-UHDY] (discussing her own experiences and those of other
start-up founders she surveyed).
339. See Fan, supra note 63, at 608 (detailing what metrics a unicorn should and should
not disclose).
340. See, e.g., Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong Liu, When Artificial Intelligence
Systems Produce Inventions: An Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3A Era, 39 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2215, 2254 (2018) (surveying first-mover advantage); Rajshree Agarwal & Michael
Gort, First-Mover Advantage and the Speed of Competitive Entry, 1887-1986, 44 J. L. &
ECON. 161, 162–65 (2001) (providing a historical overview).
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Apart from being highly speculative, these arguments offer at best a
romanticized vision of the technology founder. They also fail to explain why
major investors receive information, but other investors and employee
shareholders do not.341 Most importantly, a great many companies both
achieve their founders’ visions and have decent governance. There is no
necessary causal connection between bad governance and a creative
vision.342
V.

HOW MIGHT BETTER GOVERNANCE BE ACHIEVED?

A. Corporation Law
1.

Fiduciary Duties Should Prevent Self-Dealing

How might we achieve better governance? Arguably, no changes in the
terms of the law are needed to foster and enforce effective corporate
governance in any corporation. What may be needed, however, are changes
in how those terms are understood and enforced. As agents of the
corporation, unicorn executives and directors, like executives and directors
of any company, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation.
Therefore, for example, conflict of interest transactions—like many of the
transactions in which WeWork engaged—should be challengeable. Unlikely
to be “cleansed” by a vote of disinterested and independent directors or
ratified by disinterested shareholders, such arrangements should not be
permitted.343 Neumann’s nepotistic hiring practices, the leases he arranged
for property he owned, and his sale of the “We Company” name to the
company itself, could have been challenged. Neumann could have been
required to reimburse the company for the damages it suffered from those
transactions. In fact, self-dealing as pronounced as that engaged in by
Neumann should have been deterred in the first place.344
341. Fan, supra note 63, at 608–09.
342. For example, Microsoft was the winner of the Ethical Boardroom’s “Best Corporate
Governance” designation in 2018. See Ethical Boardroom, Corporate Governance Winners
2018 – The Americas, ETHICALBOARDROOM.COM (2018), https://ethicalboardroom.com/corp
orate-governance-winners-2018-the-americas/ [https://perma.cc/U43N-9AR6] (naming
winners in many different sectors).
343. See, e.g., In re UNFOUSA Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(finding that the board likely breached its fiduciary duties in approving a related-party
transaction).
344. One WeWork spokesman reportedly said that all related-party deals were reviewed
and approved by the board or an independent committee and disclosed to investors. Brown,
supra, note 7.
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Fiduciary Duties Should Make Unicorn Directors Vigilant

Similarly, unicorn directors, even those appointed by and connected to
powerful founders, have a duty to oversee and monitor the operations of the
corporations. This duty is not excused just because its founder has a
particular vision, or just because the founder has the voting power to remove
directors at will. The oversight duty, the idea that directors should have a
solid idea of the fundamentals of the business and the arrangements being
made by it, is a fundamental duty of all directors.345
3.

Fiduciary Duties Should Compel Managers to Make Informed,
Disinterested, Decisions in the Best Interests of the Unicorn

Directors and managers enjoy a great deal of protection because courts
presume,346 under the business judgement rule, that board decisions are
informed, disinterested, and in the best interests of the company.347 The
business judgment rule protects many if not most decisions made by
corporate managers. But even today, that protection is not limitless. It is a
rebuttable presumption.348 For example, to be granted the protection of the
business judgment rule, directors are required to fulfill their fiduciary duty
of care, notably by informing themselves about the decisions they are called
on to make.349 This is true of all corporations, private or public, regardless
of size.350

345. According to one report, the WeWork board raised concerns about leasing property
owned by Neumann in 2013, and the deal was reconfigured. The next year, however,
Neumann got control of the company with 10-votes-a-share Class B shares, and WeWork
proceeded with a number of transactions in which it leased property owned by Neumann.
Brown, supra, note 7.
346. This presumption is not limited to Delaware courts. See Business Judgment Rule –
In general, 3A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. §1036 (describing the business judgment rule as a
common-law judicial standard of review).
347. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
348. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (finding in favor of plaintiff
shareholders, who successfully rebutted the presumption that the directors were informed).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 872 (making no distinction regarding corporate size); see also Francis v. United
Jersey Bank, 431 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) (holding that “directors are under a continuing
obligation to keep informed about the activities of the corporation” in the context of a small
family-owned corporation). However, enforcement of those duties is less frequent in private
companies. See Duhigg, supra note 16 (noting that lawsuits alleging harm to minority
shareholders from board inaction are much less common in the context of private companies).
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Hurdles to Stronger Corporation Law as a Solution

A rejuvenated corporation law would be an avenue for improved
unicorn governance, but it seems unlikely. Most unicorns, indeed, most
large public companies,351 are incorporated in Delaware. WeWork,
SpaceX,352 Airbnb,353 Doordash,354 Zume,355 and Theranos, all are (or were)
incorporated in Delaware. Delaware is a popular state of incorporation not
only because of its well-developed corporation law jurisprudence, but also
because it is considered management-friendly.356 In the last few decades, the
Delaware Chancery Court and Supreme Court have consistently declined to
second-guess management decisions.357 Holding executives and directors
liable for violations of their state-law fiduciary duties is at best difficult. Not
only is Delaware judicial precedent deferential to management, but as
discussed above, the prosecution of shareholder derivative suits is
procedurally difficult.358 Despite Justice Strine, Delaware is unlikely to

351. For example, more than 66% of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as their legal
home. About the Division of Corporations, DEL. DIV. CORP (last visited Nov. 22, 2020), http
s://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency/ [https://perma.cc/SPM6-CTRQ].
352. See SpaceExploration Techs. Corp., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form
D) (Mar. 30, 2009), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1181412/0001181
41209000003/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml [https://perma.cc/4BKK-99CW] (listing the
company’s state of incorporation as Delaware).
353. See Airbnb, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Oct. 23, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1559720/000155972012000002/xslFormDX01/pri
mary_doc.xml [https://perma.cc/L9V8-8JPD] (listing the company’s state of incorporation as
Delaware).
354. See Doordash Inc., SEC Registration, https://sec.report/CIK/0001792789 [https://pe
rma.cc/B63J-4GQP] (listing the company’s state of incorporation as Delaware).
355. See Zume, Inc., SEC Registration, https://sec.report/CIK/0001690914 [https://perm
a.cc/TAF4-5FL4] (listing the company’s state of incorporation as Delaware).
356. See Alana Semuels, The Tiny State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporategovernance/502487/ [https://perma.cc/85AD-6BWP] (claiming that Delaware is friendly to
business). But see Why Businesses Choose Delaware, DELAWARE.GOV (last visited Nov. 21,
2020), https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-businesses-choose-delaware/ [https://perma.cc/36T
E-MYY3] (“Delaware is neither ‘management-friendly’ nor “stockholder-friendly.’”).
357. See Laura Bower Braunsberg, Asking the Right Question: The Mixed Consideration
Denominator Problem, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 989, 993 (2016) (quoting In re Cox Commc’ns,
Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614 (Del. Ch. 2005)) (“[T]he central idea of Delaware’s
approach to corporation law is the empowerment of centralized management, in the form of
boards of directors and the subordinate officers they choose, to make disinterested business
decisions.”).
358. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation
Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1217, 1229–31
(2012) (outlining some of the procedural difficulties).
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make things worse for managers.359
Of course, there are 49 other states. About 20 of those have enacted a
corporation law based on the Model Business Corporation Act, which is
drafted by a committee of the American Bar Association.360 Although the
two approaches share much,361 the MBCA has subtle differences including
requiring pre-demands in derivative suits,362 and an explicit rule to be applied
in the case of board conflicts of interest.363
Some states have gone even further. In 2018, California passed new
corporate governance requirements related to board composition.364 Its
“Women on Boards” law went into effect in 2019 and required all public
companies headquartered in California to have least one female director on
their boards by December 31, 2019.365 One or two or more women are
required, depending on the size of a company’s board, by December 31,
2021.366 By basing the requirement on headquarters, not state of
incorporation, California captured many of the giant technology companies
that are based there, including former unicorns such as Facebook and
Alphabet (then Google).367 Other states are following with respect to
diversity,368 although the California measure is currently being challenged in
court.369 The willingness of some states to push back against Delaware’s
359. Delaware does not have a “constituencies statute” enabling corporations to allow
their directors to consider stakeholders, but it does allow for the incorporation of public
benefit corporations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 361-68 (2019).
360. See Corporate Laws Committee, AM. BAR ASS’N (last visited Nov. 22, 2020), https:/
/www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/committees/corplaws/ [https://perma.cc/L6ZZTE4D] (displaying which states have enacted a Model Business Corporation Act-derived
corporation law).
361. See Jeffrey M. Gorris, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware
Corporate Law and The Model Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 106, 106 (2011) (arguing that the two approaches complement each
other and do not differ significantly).
362. Model Bus. Corp. Act §7.42
363. Model Bus. Corp. Act, Subchapter F, §§8.60-8.63.
364. CAL. CORP. CODE §301.3 (2019).
365. CAL. CORP. CODE §301.3(a) (2019).
366. CAL. CORP. CODE §301.3(b) (2019).
367. A companion measure made it clear that the law applies to corporations incorporated
in other states (e.g., Delaware). CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115.5 (2019).
368. Washington State’s board gender diversity law went into effect on June 11, 2020.
See Lori A. Oliver & Jessica M. Norris, Corporate Governance Emerging Best Practices
Series: Gender-Diverse Boards, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.
com/article/corporate-governance-emerging-best-practices-series-gender-diverse-boards [htt
ps://perma.cc/429S-5NHJ] (outlining the requirements of the law and predicting that similar
laws will be enacted throughout the nation).
369. See Kayla Epstein, This State Requires Company Boards to Include Women. A New
Lawsuit Says That’s Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.washingto
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erosion of corporate governance requirements may bode well for unicorn
stakeholders.
B. More Applicable (and Applied) Securities Law
1.

More Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws Should Apply to
Unicorns

Unicorn governance could also be improved through more stringent
application of the federal securities laws in the private company context. In
the last few decades, federal securities regulation has impacted corporate
governance in ways that were once exclusively the province of state law. 370
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,371 the Dodd-Frank Act,372 and a number of other
measures373 have been enacted, shaping the governance of at least large, and
generally publicly traded, corporations.
Many of those measures were put in place to curtail executive
npost.com/business/2019/11/14/this-state-requires-company-boards-include-women-new-la
wsuit-says-thats-unconstitutional/ [https://perma.cc/6Z39-DA8F] (describing several suits
filed against the new law). See Alisha Haridasani Gupta, California Companies Are Rushing
to Find Female Board Members, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2019, updated Jan. 14, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/us/california-boardroom-gender-quota.html [https://perma.cc
/A9EH-XA2Z] (reporting that two suits had been filed arguing that the law is
unconstitutional). In August 2020, the California legislature passed an additional diversity
bill requiring California-based public corporations to have at least one board member from an
underrepresented community by the end of 2021, with more required in subsequent years.
See Anne Steele, California Lawmakers Back Mandate for Racial Diversity on Corporate
Boards, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-lawmakers-m
andate-racial-diversity-on-corporate-boards-11598915372 [https://perma.cc/FNM4-HNZ3]
(explaining the requirements of the bill). Governor Newsome signed the legislation on
September 30, 2020. See Levi Sumagaysay, California Will Require Public Companies to
Have Diverse Boards, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/stor
y/california-will-require-public-companies-to-have-diverse-boards-11601504807 [https://per
ma.cc/27KJ-T2NZ] (quoting Governor Newsome as stating, “It is clear we can no longer wait
for corporations to figure it out on their own”).
370. Scholars began to speak of the “federalization” of corporation law. See, e.g., Jill E.
Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate Governance, 37
DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (2013) (arguing that Delaware’s approach is superior to a federal
approach).
371. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
372. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
373. For example, changes to the federal tax code. See, e.g., Orsolya Kun, Corporate
Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L.
313 (2004) (highlighting potential governance implications from corporate expatriations for
tax purposes).
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misbehavior and inadequate governance of publicly traded companies.
However, the key antifraud provision of the securities laws, Rule 10b-5,374
prohibits misleading statements and misrepresentations by all companies,
public and private.375 Rule 10b-5 prohibits untrue statements or omissions
of material facts or anything that operates as a fraud or deceit upon any
person “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”376
When a unicorn sells a security (debt or equity) to an investor, the SEC
has the power to ensure that investors are not misled with regard to the affairs
of the company. SEC Rule 10b-5 enforcement requires a showing that a
person made a material misrepresentation or omission in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, with scienter.377 Theoretically, if investors can
show those elements, as well as reliance, economic loss, and loss
causation,378 they may have a private right of action to seek compensation
for damages resulting from the misleading representations by such person.
The SEC has indicated that it will scrutinize unicorns closely.379 By
some accounts, the SEC has increased oversight of unlisted firms in the last
few years.380 For example, the SEC fined Zenefits and its founder, Parker
Conrad, over $1 million in 2017 for making false and misleading statements
374. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020).
375. See Kayla Stavinoha, How Unreal Is the Unicorn Now? The Need for Regulation in
the Wild-Wild-West of Private Companies, 59 WASHBURN L. J. 171, 189–90 (2020)
(discussing Rule 10b-5 and its application in the private context).
376. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020) (emphasis added).
377. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining the elements the
SEC must demonstrate to enjoin defendants from actions violating Rule 10b-5).
378. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (setting out the
requirements for a private suit).
379. This was emphasized in 2016 by then-SEC Chair Mary Jo White with respect to
unicorn corporate governance, at the SEC-Rock Center on Corporate Governance Silicon
Valley Initiative:
It is axiomatic that all private and public securities transactions, no matter the
sophistication of the parties, must be free from fraud. Exchange Act Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply to all companies and we must be vigorous in ferreting
out and punishing wrongdoers wherever they operate . . . . [In the unicorn context]
the risk of distortion and inaccuracy is amplified because start-up companies,
even quite mature ones, often have far less robust internal controls and
governance procedures than most public companies.
SEC Chair Mary Jo White, Keynote Address at the SEC-Rock Center on Corporate
Governance Silicon Valley Initiative, SEC (Mar. 31, 2016), available at https://www.sec.go
v/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-initiative-3-31-16.html [https://perma.cc/L4LE-GF
BT].
380. Matt Robinson et al., WeWork Is Facing SEC Inquiry into Possible Rule Violations,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-15/wewor
k-is-said-to-face-sec-inquiry-into-possible-rule-violations [https://perma.cc/VT66-YBG2].
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in violation of the Securities Act.381 The SEC charged Daniel Mattes, the
former CEO of identity verification service Jumio, with making false claims
about the company’s financial results.382 Mattes settled those allegations in
April 2019 for over $17 million.383 The SEC also charged Theranos, its
former CEO Holmes, and its former President Balwani with lying about the
Theranos technology while raising hundreds of millions of dollars from
investors.384 Holmes settled with the SEC for $500,000.385 There were
reports that WeWork could face similar scrutiny for violating SEC rules.386
At this time, however, when a private company is involved, SEC action is
the exception and not the rule.387
2.

The Securities Laws Could Be Amended to Require Companies
of a Certain Size to File

Another approach would be to amend current securities laws to require
companies to begin reporting once they reach a certain size. At present, the
decision to file——to become a publicly traded company, with the
constraints entailed thereby——is in the discretion of management. As
discussed above, firms historically made an IPO when they needed large
amounts of capital, usually for expansion. More recently, companies have
gone public in order for employees compensated with equity to “cash out.”388
381. YourPeople, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10429 (Oct. 26, 2017) (SEC Cease and
Desist Order), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10429.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M2FN-FJTQ] (fining Zenefits and Conrad for violations of Section 17(a)(2) of the
Securities Act, which is substantially the same as Section 10b-5).
382. See SEC Charges Former CEO of Silicon Valley Startup with Defrauding Investors,
SEC (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-50 [https://perma.cc/L9Y
W-22VY] (asserting that Mattes enriched himself at investors’ expense by making false
claims about Jumio’s financial results).
383. Id.
384. See Theranos, CEO Holmes, and Former President Balwani Charged with Massive
Fraud, SEC (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-41 [https://perma
.cc/22EB-FMF7] (charging Theranos, Holmes, and Balwani with making numerous false and
misleading statements in investor presentations. Holmes settled with the SEC in 2018, paying
a $500,000 fine).
385. Id.
386. Robinson, supra note 380. No reports of scrutiny followed, however.
387. See Stavinoha, supra note 375, at 189 (noting that there have been few SEC Rule
10b-5 enforcement actions against private companies). The SEC has this power but uses it
sparingly. See Jean Eaglesham, Unicorns’ Pre-IPO Profit Claims Get Scrutinized, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 22, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/unicorns-pre-ipo-profit-claims-get-scrutini
zed-11569172817 [https://perma.cc/6UQY-N6WM] (attributing SEC forbearance to the fact
that unicorn investors tend to be big and sophisticated).
388. See Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2
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As suggested above, companies may not need more cash than they can get
in the private markets, and therefore may postpone doing an IPO for a long
time, perhaps indefinitely. As a result, companies escape the discipline
imposed by the public markets.
There are a number of possible ways to think about a firm’s size for
purposes of requiring filing as a public company. One plausible approach,
rooted in contemporary practice, considers the valuation of the enterprise as
a whole.389 The law might require firms valued above a certain amount,
perhaps $1 billion, to file. Such a valuation trigger would have the collateral
benefit of creating an incentive for companies to operate with lower (more
conservative) valuations.390 More conservative valuations might mean
companies take longer to reach the threshold that triggers filing, as the lower
numbers might reduce the “hype” surrounding certain companies.391 The
$104 billion valuation reportedly tossed out there by Morgan Stanley392 while
pitching its IPO services certainly did not help curb the excesses at WeWork.
Another size-based possibility would look at the company’s “public
float” (i.e., the unicorn shares traded on one of the secondary market
platforms).393 Presumably, the risk to investors (if not to all stakeholders) is
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 649, 661–63 (2008) (pointing out that “going public . . . permits
insiders to cash out of the business [and enables] a company to use equity as compensation”).
389. See Fan, supra note 63, at 605–10 (suggesting that enhanced disclosure might be
structured as providing more information on the Form D, making unicorns’ restated
certificates of incorporation more easily attainable, having a plain English version of the key
certificate of incorporation terms, and providing periodic financial information similar to what
is provided to unaccredited investors in private placements).
390. Corporate insiders have substantial control in setting valuations. See Kevin Kelleher,
Here’s the Major Downside of So Many $1-Billion ‘Unicorn’ Startups, TIME (April 7, 2015),
http://time.com/3773591/unicorn-startups-downside/
[https://perma.cc/YL36-MVJS]
(calling private valuations “more art than science”). See also Nick Bilton, Is Silicon Valley
in Another Bubble . . . and What Could Burst It?, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.
vanityfair.com/news/2015/08/is-silicon-valley-in-another-bubble [https://perma.cc/8BJL-RB
JT] (noting “[t]his is hubris”).
391. See, e.g., Frances Coppola, WeWork’s IPO: The Triumph Of Hype Over
Fundamentals FORBES (Aug. 15, 2019) https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2019/0
8/15/weworks-ipo-the-triumph-of-hype-over-fundamentals/?sh=41e05bfd2f75 [https://perm
a.cc/8ADP-6N55] (noting that WeWork raised enormous amounts of money and attracted two
of the world’s biggest banks as an office space leasing company that had never made a profit).
392. Platt & Edgecliffe-Johnson, supra note 13.
393. See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, House., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 15 (2011)
(statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Colum. L. Sch.)
(proposing public reporting if a company’s public float exceeds $50 million or the 2000
shareholders threshold is passed); Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, House., & Urban
Affairs, 112th Cong. 10 (2012) (statement of Jay R. Ritter, Cordell Professor of Finance,
Warrington College of Bus. Admin., Univ. of Florida) (suggesting a reporting requirement
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magnified by secondary market trades in which investors have little or no
opportunity to receive information from the company. Therefore, using
those trades as a trigger would make sense.
Some also propose continued exemptions from registration if the
companies maintain strict restrictions on transfer or commit to some kind of
public disclosure.394 Such a proposal would maintain the exemption for
family-owned and controlled companies395 that, despite their many
stakeholders, do not seem to be beset by the same level of corporate
governance problems as this new class of unicorns.396
Once the requirement to file is triggered by either the number of
shareholders or the company’s total valuation, unicorns would be disciplined
by the required disclosure and transparency and, perhaps even more
importantly, GAAP accounting for actual money earned.397
C. New Federal Legislation
A final way to improve unicorn governance may be simply to impose
new federal legislation to address it. Perhaps Delaware and its sibling states
are not going to act, but recent history suggests that Congress might.398 Highprofile excesses like those reported at Uber, Theranos, Zenefits and now
WeWork could put pressure on the government to address the issue.
For example, in 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed the
Accountable Capitalism Act.399 The act would make all companies with
once a public float amount is exceeded and advocating maintaining the then-500 shareholders
cap).
394. Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hold in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite
the Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 1151, 207–11 (2013).
395. See Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy of Section 12(g), 2015 U.
ILL L. REV. 1529, 1554–55 (2015) (discussing the stability of a number of family
owned/controlled companies).
396. Some examples might include Cargill, Koch Industries, Albertsons, and Deloitte.
Certainly, these companies also have issues, but they are substantially more stable than many
of the unicorns.
397. See Eaglesham, supra note 387 (pointing out that going public means that they have
to report numbers based on standard accounting rules, which often reveal losses, sometimes
huge ones).
398. In the last two decades, Congress has enacted measures related to corporate
governance several times. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116
Stat.745 (among other things, requiring enhanced reporting and certification of company
financials and prohibiting loans to executives); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (among other things,
requiring companies to offer shareholders a non-binding “say-on-pay” with respect to
executive compensation).
399. S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). The bill faced strong criticism and did not advance.
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annual gross receipts above $1 billion subject to a federal corporate
governance regime.400 The federal regime would, among other things,
require the board to consider the interests of all stakeholders, including
employees, customers, suppliers, investors, and local communities.401
Although somewhat narrow and controversial, the proposed act does indicate
an interest by some lawmakers in bringing our largest companies under
control. Unicorns could be a related target.
Alternatively, a measure like California’s Women on Boards law could
be imposed at a federal level. A number of European countries have similar
measures.402 Addressing the homogeneity in company decision-making and
funding structures would hopefully result in an improvement in all corporate
governance, including unicorns. And the improved governance would help
protect stakeholders.
Another approach might be to roll back some of the JOBS Act
measures. Restoring the 500-holder trigger or ceasing to allow the general
solicitation for Rule 506(c) placements might drive more unicorns into the
public markets. Still, given other demands upon the federal government’s
attention, even modest federal legislation to govern unicorns seems unlikely.
IV.

CONCLUSION: ANY WILL WORK, NONE SOON

The issue is not that unicorn governance cannot be improved, but that
we simply have not taken steps to do so. As the number of unicorns
continues to swell, and their impacts are felt by more stakeholders, the need
for sound corporate governance may rouse lawmakers to act.
There is little reason, however, to be optimistic that new laws will be
passed anytime soon. Reporters at the Wall Street Journal are more
See, e.g., Milton Ezrati, Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Bill Has Big Problems,
FORBES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2019/02/05/senator-warre
ns-accountable-capitalism-bill-has-big-problems/#64b1751c471b [https://perma.cc/5NN6-P
P3A] (explaining negative unintended consequences of the proposed legislation).
400. S. 3348, 115th Cong. §2(2) (2018) (defining “Large Entity”).
401. S. 3348, 115th Cong. §5(c)(1) (2018) (establishing standards of conduct for directors
and instructing them to consider various stakeholder interests).
402. See generally VERA JOUROVA, European Comm., GENDER BALANCE ON CORPORATE
BOARDS > EUROPE IS CRACKING THE GLASS CEILING 7–8 (Jul. 2016) (providing a chart
showing which European countries have quotas or other measures requiring or promoting
gender diversity on corporate boards); see also Legislative Quotas Can Be Strong Drivers for
Gender Balance in Boardrooms, EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOR GENDER EQUALITY, (Jun. 28,
2019), https://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/dgs/data-talks/legislative-quotas-can-be-stron
g-drivers-gender-balance-boardrooms [https://perma.cc/XPM8-4CMV] (reporting that the
proportion of women on boards of the EU’s largest companies more than doubled between
2010 and 2019).
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responsible for uncovering the mischief at WeWork than any of the
traditional gatekeepers or regulators. Investment banks, law firms, and some
of the world’s largest funds did little to discourage the WeWork excesses,
and in fact by some reports encouraged them. The SEC received a
confidential draft of the WeWork Form S-1 in December 2018. The
document, after the SEC had had an opportunity to request revisions, was
still riddled with mistakes and misstatements when it was released in August
2019. It is certainly true that the SEC raised a number of questions about the
document, but it seems that bad publicity, not the SEC’s initiative, scuttled
the offering.
In all likelihood, unicorns will continue to lurch through the economy,
including the financial markets, for the foreseeable future. There probably
will be many more scandals, more lost investment, and more “collateral”
damage to stakeholder interests. None of this is entirely new. In the late 19th
century, the United States witnessed the rise of enormous “trust” companies
that were established by “robber barons.” The early 20th century came to
understand the dangers of giant, monopolistic entities run by a few
individuals, eventually inspiring government “trust-busting” policies.
Maybe, someday, unicorns will cause losses of sufficient magnitude to
inspire legal reform of their governance. But that is hardly something for
which to hope.

